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container shipping company 
 
Degree: Master of Science 
 
E-commerce has been an emerging concept and is widely applied within several 
different industry sectors. The most crucial and growing questions for container 
shipping companies are whether to engage in shipping e-commerce and how to set the 
online direct price if so. In order to propose a valuable and applicable pricing strategy 
for a container shipping company in e-commerce environment, the dissertation 
originally applies the pricing strategy in the dual-channel supply chain in the container 
shipping industry.     
Firstly, a modified conceptual dual-channel supply chain in the container shipping 
industry is constructed. Secondly, seven factors which influence pricing strategy and 
profits are selected and discussed as inputs to profit models. Thirdly, Nash equilibrium 
game theory and consumer utility theory are applied synthetically to construct models. 
After constructing and optimizing profit models, the optimal pricing strategy for 
container shipping company is proposed to supplement the relevant decision-making 
framework. Fourthly, the effects of independent variables on the pricing strategy and 
profits are discussed in-depth through numerical examples with reference to real 
market data provided by an international shipping company. The results indicate that 
the online selling channel has not yet been developed for a container shipping company 
to enter into e-commerce because of the high initial investment and low cargo owners’ 
preference for online direct channel. Moreover, the results show that the optimal 
pricing strategy is dynamic with changes in inputs. If container shipping companies 
set the online direct price randomly, they may lose customers and profit.  
The dissertation not only opens up a research field on pricing strategy in the dual-
channel supply chain in the container shipping industry, but also establishes an 
applicable pricing strategy for a container shipping company.  
 
KEYWORDS: dual-channel supply chain, pricing strategy, Nash equilibrium, 
consumer utility theory, container shipping industry.  
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Chapter 1 : INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter explains the nature of the container shipping industry and the 
emergence of e-commerce in the industry. Thus, an overview of the importance of a 
pricing strategy for the container shipping industry in the context of e-commerce 
environment is emphasized.  
 
1.1. Background 
The characteristics of container shipping industry and the emergence of e-
commerce in container shipping industry are described as follows. 
 
1.1.1. Container shipping industry 
The container shipping industry (CSI) is an intricate market which has distinct 
freight rate mechanisms rather than any economic explanations of demand and supply. 
Under the law of supply and demand, equilibrium price is difficult to identify due to 
the influences of different variables. Profitability is critical to the sustainability of 
shipping firms.  
Container shipping companies are vulnerable to crisis. Since the invention of 
containers in 1956, the CSI has been confronted with several crises. The crises are the 
two oil crises in 1973 and 1979; the financial crisis in the beginning of the 1990s, the 
Asian crisis in 1997; the stock-market crash in 2001 and the credit/mortgage crisis 
between 2008 and 2009. The crises resulted in growing maturity debt levels in most 
of shipping firms (Kelly, Bengtsson, Lin, & Baker, 2016). Shipping companies have 
faced considerable losses after the crisis in 2008. For instance, Maersk Line lost 
approximately 2.1$ billion USD while around 20$ billion USD is recorded as the 
collective loss of other shipping carriers (UNCTAD, 2010). CSI, therefore, is sensitive 
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to any change in global economic growth. Similar to many other industries, CSI has 
numbers of uncertainties. Even though there was a recovery in 2010, the unforeseeable 
and fluctuations cases such as the bankruptcy of Hanjin Shipping has created more 
uncertainties in the market which result in more difficulty in setting the prices. 
Essentially, increasing uncertainties go with more risks and make it harder to make the 
right decisions.  
In short, the evolutions of CSI and the nature of shipping industry are developed 
with the VUCA concept: volatility, uncertainty, complexity, ambiguity. This acronym 
becomes more critical to consider in strategic shipping planning. The carriers have to 
consider the VUCA shipping environment and invest in information management, 
experimentations and predictions (Bennett & Lemoine, 2014). As a result, a strategic 
marketing plan for appropriate pricing decision is necessary for shipping firms. In 
order to set up a pricing strategy, shipping enterprises have to consider several 
elements that affect prices, especially the business forecasting and negotiating tools 
for pricing determination. A good pricing strategy is evitable to be better off in the 
VUCA environment, not only to challenge the changing environment and competition 
in the market but also to secure financial sustainability for the company.  
 
1.1.2. The emergence of e-commerce in the container shipping industry 
Today, digitalization and e-commerce trends are inevitable. There is evidences 
of the rise in sales, revenue and market volume in both top-performing economies and 




 Figure 1. Historical and projected retail e-commerce sales worldwide between 
2014 and 2021 (in billion U.S dollars).  
Source: eMarketer. Statista (2018) 
 
Figure 1 shows the information on worldwide sales by retail e-commerce 
between 2014 and 2021. In 2020, worldwide retail revenues are expected to reach 
$4135 billion USD and predicted to increase to 4878$ billion USD in 2021. As a result, 
e-commerce sales represent large revenues for businesses worldwide and are expected 
to have a steady increase trend.  
Furthermore, with no signal of decline, there is a constant growth share of e-
commerce in relation to its global share of retail, expecting 11.9% and 17.5% in 2018 




Figure 2. Share of e-retail in total global retail sales from 2015 to 2021 
Source: eMarketer. Statista (2018) 
 
E-commerce is increasingly shaping the business model in many industry 
sectors. Benefits of e-commerce include the monitoring of trade transaction and 
operations costs, the orientation of products and services through electronic interaction 
with customers, and as an assistance development of supply chain management. 
Communication technology devices and the availability of information are 
increasingly transforming competition patterns as well as reshaping the boundaries of 
industries.  
E-commerce is defined by World Trade Organization as follows: “e-commerce 
is the production, distribution, marketing, sales or delivery of goods and services by 
electronic means" (WTO, 1998). 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
defines E-commerce as follows: “E-commerce refers generally to all forms of 
transactions relating to commercial activities, including both organizations and 
individuals, that are based upon the processing and transmission of digitized data, 
including text, sound and visual images” (OECD, 1997).  
 5
The definition of e-commerce has been changing over the past 30 years. E-
commerce originally refers to “the facilitation of transactions electronically”. 
However, e-commerce still keeps its original function as supporting commercial 
transactions for goods and services in either intangible or tangible forms. The 
evolvement of e-commerce time by time in CSI is described as following: In the 1960s, 
big container shipping lines started to build up electronic databases with distribution 
systems on network platforms to control commodities, transhipment of goods and 
delivery operations, together with the purpose of making the most of resources through 
controlling empty containers. Over time, e-commerce aims to serve client's demand, 
as a public system platform when Internet becomes more and more developed. In the 
early 1990s, infrastructure and software costs, the lack of standards for electronic 
information exchange in the industry, along with the unwillingness to abandon paper-
based commercial practices, they became obstacles to adopt e-commerce. In the late 
1990s, when policy and legal issues, for example the governments were not willing to 
face e-commerce challenges and the legal issues related to electronic transactions 
became major obstacles to the use of e-commerce. Nevertheless, within a short time, 
e-commerce has become an effective tool which is used in CSI. 
 
Conclusion. 
Current shipping lines are confronted with a variety of obstacles in a competitive 
environment, for example, low freight rates but high fuel cost, clients’ requests for safe 
shipment at a lessened cost and an ambiguous system unable to convey a concrete 
information flow. Especially, demand or shipping services and the ability to deal with 
cargo illustrates an apparent challenge. This is the reason why it is essential to have an 
automated and real-time tool to tackle these matters to assure that supply and demand 
can meet.  
Operating models and digital technologies are as of now pushing shipping 
companies to team up with digital data suppliers. The business network is ready to 
widen their knowledge and capacities over the shadow of traditional marketplace 
activities. Advanced digital devices can improve shipping administrations and services 
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by providing immediate, near-instant access to end customers, all with negligible 
transaction costs that can be eliminated to their shippers or freight forwarder. Most 
shipping liners acknowledge the importance of the end-to-end supply chain and have 
already embraced e-commerce with the target of completely automating shipping 
procedures, such as shipment booking, vessel plan, rate shopping, and documentation. 
While recognizing the significance of a web-based business, a number of shipping 
companies are implementing the platform gradually. A crucial challenge is 
overcoming the difficulties in business while keeping on track with the innovative 
advanced technologies. Building a fundamental IT foundation along with abiding by 
shipping regulations is also crucial for the emergence of technologies emergence in 
digital commerce.  
 
1.2. Research objectives and questions 
A container shipping companies need a scientific system or optimal pricing 
strategy to set the online direct price in order to increase profits. There are two main 
reasons. The first one is the inevitable trend of e-commerce in the CSI. The CSI has 
already entered into e-commerce emerging stage. In response to the development of e-
commerce and advanced technology, several shipping companies and NVOCC have 
already established an e-commerce platform with an online channel. The development 
of the online channel has been encouraged by both the issues of e-commerce and spot 
rate shipping business. Customers desire to have a simple, easy to control, flexible and 
transparent system and technology to make it conceivable. As a result, shipping liners 
and freight forwarders expect a flexible network to meet an “on demand economy” 
with shorter contracts and spot rate demands. This pattern is enormously supported by 
the volatile nature of freight rates.  The second reason is that the emergence of e-
commerce in CSI has positive and negative impacts on all the CSI participants under 
different market conditions. If a container shipping company randomly sets the online 
direct price, this will definitely lead to conflicts between online direct and offline retail 
channels and damage the profits of the respective players in the supply chain. 
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The main objective of the dissertation is to propose the optimal online direct 
price for container shipping companies to maximize their profit in a dual-channel 
supply chain. The dissertation attempts to discuss and answer the following questions:  
1. What are the factors influencing the pricing strategy and profits of container 
shipping company and NVOCC/freight forwarder in the decentralized dual-channel 
supply chain? 
2. What are the Nash equilibrium results of optimal online direct and offline 
retail prices for a container shipping company and NVOCC/freight forwarder 
respectively in the decentralized dual-channel supply chain? 
3. What are the implications of the Nash equilibrium results for a container 
shipping company?  
(1) Has the online direct channel been fully developed for the container shipping 
industry to enter into e-commerce? 
(2) If not, what are the reasons? Why only some container shipping companies 
have started to use online direct channel? 
(3) How to promote the process of e-commerce in the container shipping 
industry? 
4. What are the impacts of influencing factors’ changes on the pricing strategy 
and profits of container shipping companies and NVOCC/freight forwarders?  
 
1.3. Dissertation outline 
In order to answer the questions proposed in chapter 1.2, the dissertation consists 
of 5 chapters and is illustrated as follows. 
 Chapter 1: Introduction  
 Chapter 2: Literature Review  
 Chapter 3: Method 
 Chapter 4: Numerical examples, findings and implications 













Figure 3. Research process and dissertation outline 
 
Figure 3 presents a brief overview of the research process and dissertation 
outline. The rest of dissertation are arranged as outlined below.  
In chapter 2, an overview of related articles and research is concluded to show 
the impacts of the online direct channel on pricing strategy and profits in CSI. The 
following questions are discussed in chapter 2: What has been studied and developed 
by previous scholars in literature and research regarding the topic? What is the gap 
between the current study and questions for our topic? What is the innovation of the 
dissertation in order to solve the questions listed in chapter 1.2. 
In chapter 3, the Nash equilibrium results of online direct and offline retail prices 
for a container shipping company and NVOCC/freight forwarder are derived through 
models’ construction and optimization. The following steps are used to construct the 
profit models for a container shipping company and NVOCC/freight forwarder. Firstly, 
the factors that influence the pricing strategy and profits in the dual-channel supply 
chain are discussed, and part of them are selected as inputs of the models. Secondly, 
the model framework is constructed to clarify the objectives, inputs, assumptions and 
output of the profit models. Thirdly, the consumer utility functions are used to derive 
the profit models for a container shipping company and NVOCC/freight forwarder. 
After constructing the profit models, the Nash equilibrium theory is used to find the 
optimal online direct and offline retail price for a container shipping company and 
(1) Introduction 
(2) Literature review 
(3) Method 




NVOCC/freight forwarder in the decentralized dual-channel supply chain. In short, 
the first and second questions listed in chapter 1.2 are answered in chapter 3. 
In chapter 4, several numerical examples are implemented and their implications 
for container shipping companies are concluded. In order to make sure that this 
dissertation is useful and applicable to the CSI, the independent variables with 
reference to real data from an international shipping company are used. Sensitivity 
analyses of independent variables is conducted through numerical examples. The 
effects of independent variables’ changes on pricing strategy and profits are discussed 
in-depth. Moreover, the findings and implications are also summarized 
correspondingly. In short, the third and fourth questions listed in chapter 1.2 are 
answered in chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 draws the conclusion. The highlights and the limitation are concluded 







Chapter 2 : LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter presents some definitions which are used in the dissertation and 
numbers of related studies about dual-channel supply chain management and pricing 
strategy. Hence, it explains the gap of the previous related research and introduces the 
contribution of this dissertation to dual-channel supply chain study. 
 
2.1. The impacts of e-commerce on container shipping industry  
The rapid development of e-commerce in CSI is explained with its evolution 
through the years together with its impacts on the stakeholders. The current use of e-
commerce in the shipping industry is also presented. 
 
2.1.1. E-commerce evolution in the container shipping industry 
The framework of technological evolution is described by Auh (2003) with two 
critical concepts: technological discontinuity with 3 phases (ferment, transitional, and 
mature phase) in Figure 4. 
The technology discontinuity is the point when a new revolutionary technology 
is introduced and replaces the current technologies. Since then, new industry dynamics 
are established and the competition in the industry is entirely followed by a variety of 
accomplished “product innovations”. Numbers of new founded companies will join 
the market with product designs and compete with each other and/or with the industry 
bearers in compliance with the product capabilities. Many companies grow in this 
period of time which is called the “ferment” phase. When the companies have more 
knowledge of the demands for the product, the gap between new products shrink.  
Hence, a “dominant design” appears with a collection of product’s basic technical 
functionalities which is accepted among the industry participants. 
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The transitional phase comes after the ferment phase when the dominant design 
emerges. This period also goes with a substantial sudden decrease. The transitional 
phase is intrinsically shorter than the ferment phase. Additionally, the number of firms 
in the transitional phase is estimated to drop 50% compared to the ferment phase.  
When the companies within the industry are stabilized with the increasing 
number of consolidations among companies, the mature phase appears. In this phase, 
the innovation emphasizes not only the product itself but also the process of 
manufacturing. The enterprises in this phase compete with prices rather than product 
quality. The product with an agreed upon standard from the industry participants is 
substantially commoditized. The product is also complemented with distribution 
channel, reputation, brand to promote its value, hence it becomes more competitive in 
the market. The complementary assets to the product are established during the 
ferment and transitional phases which create the barriers for the new entrants.  
 
                Ferment Phase                      Transitional Phase          Mature Phase 
 
 
Technological                              Dominant             Technological 
Discontinuity 1       Design (DD)       Discontinuity2 
 
 Technology 










Ferment Phase         Transitional Phase         Mature Phase           
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Number of  
companies 
 











Ferment Phase         Transitional Phase         Mature Phase   
 
Figure 4. Technology evolution framework 
Source: Auh (2003) 
 
Technological evolutions in the CSI was described by Auh (2003) with 4 
adopted major technological innovations: containerization, intermodalism, the double-
stack train (DST) system, and EDI connections. E-commerce in this dissertation is 
considered to be the next innovative technology which drastically affects CSI.  
Container shipping lines and shippers uniquely benefits from technological 
innovation but through the years, the technological innovation turns to be 
commoditized. There are no exclusive rights for the innovations in CSI which allow 
new entrants to make use of innovations. They pay no substantial premiums to the 
innovators. E-commerce emerges in CSI slowly and have been taking advantage of the 
benefits of all stakeholders for mutual industry benefits. 
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The combination of the development of CSI and the framework of the 
technological evolution is explained as follows: 
- The “technological discontinuity” in maritime shipping industry is when the 
container shipping service was first introduced in 1956. Literally, in the framework of 
technological evolution “containerization” is equal to “technological discontinuity”. 
- Containerization was followed with a range of “product innovations” including 
intermodalism and the DST systems. Technically, intermodalism and the DST systems 
concentrated on improving efficient logistics services.  
- “Dominant design” in CSI emerges with a consolidated functionalities of 
container shipping services such as shore-based container cranes, the standardized 
containers, intermodal connections to implement door-to-door container shipping 
services and hub-and-spoke system. 
- Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) followed up as “process innovation” after 
the agreed upon by industry participants with dominant design. Without revising the 
basic layouts of container shipping services, EDI considerably supported to enhance 
the information process of container shipping. Furthermore, current internet-based 
business activities focus on enhance the process of container shipping service rather 
than the product. The presence of e-commerce in this point marks the innovative 
technology in improving process of container shipping service together with EDI. 
- In the context of technological evolution, CSI is currently in the mature phase. 
Therefore, there are high barriers for the new entrant to join forces due to capital-
intensive requirements and for the players to exit the industry as well. The 
complementary assets including reputation, brand, distribution-channels critically 
requires competent management (see Figure 4). 
Importantly, the container shipping service is substantially commoditized. which 
leads to the low profitability of container shipping services. An efficient cost 
management and a proper pricing strategy are important for competition – a strategic 
plan for the success.  
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2.1.2. The impacts of e-commerce to the stakeholders in the container 
shipping industry 
E-commerce considerably impacts transport services in many aspects. Firstly, it 
creates more demand on transport services. The customers in liner shipping are 
generally divided into two types, namely scattered customers and contract customers. 
The container shipping companies have to deal with an increase of scattered customers 
through online booking thanks to the development of e-commerce. As a result, the 
stability and predictability of booking slots is enhanced. In addition, these customers 
are not as sophisticated as the contract customers. Liner shipping companies, therefore, 
have to establish a cutting-edge set of supply chain to the clients with diversity of 
shipment origins and destinations or a greater responsiveness. Secondly, the demands 
of the customer on the following day or even the same-day of delivery requires 
shipping companies to not only to be ready to ship but also to maintain the slots across 
the scheduled vessels. Fortunately, the shipping industry does not have to suffer 
inventory cost. However, shipping companies will have to review the network of 
vessel’s slots and ensure the in-time delivery for the shipments that the customers 
booked regardless of whether container is full or less. This pressures the container 
shipping companies about infrastructure and management plans.  
E-commerce promotes transportation exchanges as it proposes more options for 
Internet-based transaction. This stimulates the competition among carriers in 
transportation services supply. Theoretically, all the carriers can approach the demand 
of worldwide cargo transport. The competition, therefore, turns out to be a 
disadvantage for small carriers with incompetent services. On the other hand, e-
commerce improves the capability of shipping companies to control and manage the 
whole transportation chain, which results in an enhancement in the chain’s 
performances. Furthermore, this will promote the emergence of dominant shipping 
companies through merges or vertical integration against competition.  
Regarding to the cargo owners, the transportation services, which are offered 
with the Internet-based transportation system, assist the cargo owners to access the 
order through enterprise resource planning system. The order will automatically be 
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sent to the carriers’ transportation management system. This system will regulate and 
accept the price, concede the order, convey the messages about pick up of the 
shipment, inform the consignees and carrier and pay for the carrier’s charges. The 
cargo owners have to access one website and possess customized overview of the 
shipment in transit, shipment status, deviation reports, pick-ups arrangements and up-
to-date freight rate across the routes. E-commerce creates a better partnership among 
cargo owners and carriers by providing a direct contact between them. This reduces 
the monopolies in transportation services that influence the service price. Cargo 
owners and container shipping lines may rely on confidential price negotiations and 
contracts for better pricing. Individual contracts can be made in some major trade 
routes for liner shipments. 
E-commerce decreases the importance of traditional freight forwarders and other 
intermediaries. In response to the increasing demand of their services, several 
intermediaries have developed new business models, for instance value-added 
logistics services, and improved the capacity of door-to-door services. Intermediaries 
are attractive because of their specialized knowledge of and experience in a variety of 
issues including packing, warehouse, formalities and documents, customs and 
transportation. The cargo owners can look for know-hows with issue-related 
information online; however, the wide variety of services that are offered by 
forwarders are exclusive to continue to enjoy.  
Today, cargo owners have better choices than ever before to discover prices and 
engage in instant transactions. The carriers have considered NVOCC, freight 
forwarders or other shipping lines to be competitive threats, they now have to face the 
fact that shippers can access price tools to make quick procurement decisions. One of 
those tools are freight rate marketplaces, which are the model of digital freight 
forwarders that can be easily used to have quick quoting interface, and the 
establishment of freight forwarding companies who launched instant quotation and 
booking platforms that are suitable for their NVOCC business. If the shipping lines 
aim to bring shippers to an online quotation environment, it is neccessary to invest in 
such tools. Moreover, they have to get rid of a long-time culture of rate opacity into 
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transparency. One apparent example is when the customers looks for quoting or 
booking directly from the shipping lines. The customers have to use several mouse 
clicks to request a quote. Some online systems have areas to search directly for sailing 
schedules in the homepage. However, the shipper faces difficulty in receiving 
immediate quotes even though they accessed to request quotes from electronic forms. 
The customers are then frustrated and find other alternatives with better providers. 
Thus, at present, there is a few proportion deals by online channels, and the shipping 
companies do not pay more attention to the pricing strategy. According to the studies 
of supply chain coordination in the dual-channel, the dual-channel cannot ensure the 
increase of manufacturers’ profits and there are conflicts between two channels. Only 
through appropriate analysis and coordinated contract design, the whole supply chain 
profits can be improved. 
 
2.1.3. Current use of e-commerce in the container shipping industry 
(1) Sell-side e-commerce 
Sell-side business in e-commerce refers to a number of clients access a single 
firm’s website to purchase products with specific prices (see Figure 5). Sell-side e-
commerce is a distinct chance for shipping lines when the container slots on the ship 
can be considered as a standardized commodity. The perception works well with 
regular bookings, but in some cases such as peak demands, special containers or last-







Figure 5. Sell-side in e-commerce  





Internet website Customers 
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Although the 12 largest worldwide container companies account for 85% of the 
world's shipping containers, CSI is still quite far from reaching shippers through e-
commerce tools. For example, there are only two major container companies in the 
world, Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd, which allow shippers to access actual rates through 
the ordering tool as shown in Table 1 as below. 
 
Table 1. Carrier instant quote capability 
Source: Johnson (2018) 







Maersk Line    
Mediterranean 
Shipping Co 
   
COSCO    
CMA CGM    
Hapag Lloyd    
ONE    
EverGreen Line    
Yang Ming    
PIL    
Huyndai    
ZIM    
WanHai    
*no electronic quoting available 
 
Most of the digitalization in shipping companies, from an operational or 
customer-related perspective, is concentrated in these biggest 12 companies. The 
current small and medium-sized companies do not have enough capacity to develop 
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their online sales system to engage with their customers. With most of the top 12 
container carriers, the customers have to keep in touch through email or electronically 
for rate inquiries. Five out of twelve have no electronic quoting system to respond to 
electronic rate requests. Only three container lines among the top 12 offer instant 
quotes for customers while the others require the clients to submit the electronic rate 
requests. The notable e-commerce tools from the container shipping lines are Maersk 
Line with ship.maerskline.com and my.maerskline.com tools; CMA CGM with e-
Business suite, Hapag-Lloyd’s QuickQuotes tool. However, all the platforms require 
the clients to register with username and passwords. Moreover, the most carriers have 
practically no direct quoting or booking widget on their respective home pages. They 
locate in the “e-services” tab in the menu tools and require a number of clicks to 
request a quote. Many platforms demonstrate the search for sailing schedules from the 
homepage which linked with a possibility for direct booking. Besides, more than half 
of the top 12 container lines have created the functionality for rate quote requests via 
electronic form but hardly ever receive instant quotes (Johnson, 2018). This reflects a 
long way for clients to make use of e-commerce tools while they are more popular in 
other industries. The questions are posed among the stakeholders, especially the small 
and medium sized companies, about whether the carriers are keen on business 
transaction with online quoting platforms. 
 
(2) Buy-side e-commerce 
Buy-side business in e-commerce refers to the ability to enter and purchase the 
orders from one client to different numbers of companies (see Figure 6). A wide range 
of companies can handle the order and bid each other for the best offer. The customers 
benefit by using the platform while the sellers have better chances of receiving large 
orders. E-commerce has moved from product-orientation to customer-orientation. In 
the shipping industry, freight forwarders and cargo-owners can take advantage of this 
strategy because there are limited affordable sellers in this e-commerce market. The 










Figure 6. Buy-side in e-commerce 
Source: Van Ham & Kuipers (2004) 
 
When the information and communication technology is more advanced, more 
companies concentrate on implementing e-commerce. There is an increasing number 
of companies entering into the shipping industry with e-commerce as a tool. While 
several of them are container shipping enterprises, the others are air and inland 
transport enterprises. NVOCC can also emerge into the e-commerce system and the 
cargo owners can also require information from the third-party infomediaries thanks 
to the e-commerce system. 
In April 2000, five shipping lines in CSI, including MSC Mediterranean 
Shipping Co., Maersk-Sealand, Hamburg Sub, CMA CGM and P&O Nedlloyd, 
launched a B2B Internet portal. It is a big leap to invest in the transportation portal on 
the Internet. As a result, an e-commerce platform, namely INTTRA, was introduced 
in 2001 as an initiative. None of the investors have the majority shares of the company 
as it is a neutral one. It presents an organizational variant of a virtual web with district 
characteristics led by a steering committee. Kuehne-Nagel and Hapag-Lloyd later also 
joined forces. Moreover, INTTRA welcomes non-ocean carrier participants with some 
fees. At the end of 2001, INTTRA was supported by 12 major shipping companies and 
served over 42% of the ocean-going transportation market. To be more specific, 
INTTRA at that time had over 1400 registrants from 400 companies in 50 countries 
controlling over 60,000 containers and 35,000 bookings (Ham & Kuipers, 2004). Due 
to the sponsorship from major carriers, freight forwarders, shippers and consignees are 
Companies Internet website Customer 
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not charged for accessing the service while the shipping companies have more savings 
with all availability of event information, schedules and bookings via the software.  
Shippers benefits from INTTRA as a single integrated process for all activities 
from booking, tracking and tracing commodities from numbers of carriers. The 
customers can interact in the platform through different communication channels via 
Internet, phone and email. Furthermore, an online sailing schedule are essentially 
available with thorough information about vessel/slot availability, date of 
departure/arrival, list of terminals/ports, total transit time together with options for 
shipping alerts and instructions, contract and report management. INTTRA, hence, is 
an innovative web-based partner portal as a variety of stakeholders work closely in a 
system. Besides, large shipping companies currently prefer to have their own platform 
on their respective official websites. For example, Maersk, CMA-CGM and Hapag-
Lloyd built their own platform for promoting e-commerce with business transaction 
by themselves. Despite the fact that e-commerce is slow to access into container 
shipping companies, e-commerce in CSI faces limited customer preferences. The 
customers lack knowledge of IT and get more challenges to struggle with the platform 
functions. They tend to prefer the traditional way to look for the intermediaries for 
better support. 
 
2.2. Pricing strategy in dual-channel supply chain  
The dual-channel has a variety of impacts on the profits and decisions of 
manufacturers and traditional retailers. With the e-market place environment, the inter-
base global market is opened to everyone and everywhere, which allows the 
manufacturers to have direct approach to the customers and affects the benefits of 
traditional retailers. An unreasonable pricing strategy in the dual-channel supply chain 
can result in the clashes among the channels, hence, pricing problems are one of the 






2.2.1. Dual-channel supply chain and pricing strategy 
(1) Dual-channel supply chain 
With the emergence of e-commerce, customers are getting familiar with online 
direct channels. By using online channels, the companies can handle the orders and 
arrange the logistics service timely. A number of manufacturers face the challenge of 
setting up a direct selling channel parallel with the existing traditional channel. It 
derives with the fact that the supply chain has offline (traditional retail) with the 
presence of retailers and the electronic (direct sales) channels thanks to the Internet-
based system. Li (2018) explained the phenomenon in his paper, ie the development 
of both online and offline channels is called dual-channel supply chain. Figure 7 











Offline retail channel 
Online direct channel 
 
Figure 7. Dual-channel supply chain 
Source: Li (2018) 
 
The rapid development of advanced technology has promoted research on dual-
channel supply chain management. Chiang, Chhajed and Hess (2003) has studied that 





also reduces their costs compared to traditional sales channels. Fruchter and Tapiero 
(2005) studied the problems of dual-channel distribution from consumer perspectives 
by taking advantage of multiple regression analysis and structural equation modeling. 
The research shows that online sales channel cannot replace traditional sales channel, 
consumers prefer both sales channels. Szmerekovsky and Zhang (2009) analyzed the 
decision-making issues of both manufacturers and retailers in advertising activities. 
Luo, Li and Zhang (2014) studied the profit and service of all the stakeholders in dual-
channel supply chain, the effect of “bidirectional free-riding” on the pricing and the 
conditions for manufacturers before setting up any direct online network. Huang, Yang 
and Zhang (2012) showed that customers' demand changes and preferences affect 
manufacturer's production strategy as well as retail price strategy. Liu and Zhang 
(2006) found that retailers will make use of price discrimination to oppose 
manufactures who develop a direct sales system to benefits retailers. Research on dual-
channel supply chain have emphasized on the decision-making, the conflict among 
channels in dual-channel supply chain, the coordination mechanism in the dual- 
channel supply chain and more importantly, pricing strategy of dual-channel supply 
chain. 
When studying on dual-channel supply chain, the supply chain is divided into 
two groups: centralized and decentralized supply chains. In the centralized supply 
chain, the whole supply chain is dominated by manufacturers or retailers. All 
participants in the supply chain make their own decisions based on mutual trust, 
sharing of information, and maximizing the overall interests. The purpose of such 
centralized supply chain is to minimize the total cost or maximize the total revenue of 
the supply chain as a whole. In the decentralized supply chain, there is a game 
relationship among participants. All participants in the supply chain make decisions 
independently with the goal of minimizing their own costs or maximizing their own 
benefits. Zhengping and Yezheng (2013) concluded that the equilibrium price of 
decision-making in decentralization is different in dual-channel structures. When free-
riders exists, equilibrium price exists in a decentralized supply chain and a prompt 
pricing strategy is proposed to maximize the overall supply chain’s profit. Modak and 
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Kelle (2019) presented that the centralized channel system produces more profit than 
the decentralized one. The optimal online delivery lead time in the centralized supply 
chain is also higher than that of the decentralized supply chain. With the reduction of 
online lead time sensitivity, the manufacturer should reduce the retail lead time 
because of the low return rate with the outgoing unsatisfied customers. Zhang and 
Wang (2018) examined the static and dynamic pricing model in both centralized and 
decentralized decision models and propose a two-part tariff contract under the long-
term price forecasting mechanism. Ranjan and Jha (2019) examined decision models 
in developing green quality and sales effort for optimal performance in the supply 
value chain. This research also took advantage of the Stackelberg game to achieve the 
optimal results of decentralized and centralized models. Generally, the centralized 
model essentially gave the most supply chain profit and assisted in achieving economic 
targets. Dual-channel in supply chain has been studied in a great deal of research under 
both the centralized and decentralized mechanism.  
In short, manufacturers can comprehend the needs of customers through the 
direct sales channels and predict the market demand more accurately accordingly. This 
enhances not only profitability but also customer satisfaction. Consequently, 
manufacturers are motivated to participate in the market by implementing dual-
channel supply chain which creates more competition in the market. However, retailers 
are against manufacturer's online sales system. They argue that online channel directly 
threatens traditional retail channels, rendering the conflict between dual-channel 
supply chains more noteworthy. This makes the impact of dual-channel supply chain 
management more difficult and it leads to the failure of dual supply chain operations.  
The impact of opening online channel in the dual-channel essentially are 
examined in a numbers of research fields. Dual-channel cannot make sure definite 
profits increase for manufactures; channel conflicts exist and affect many issues for 
both the manufacturers and the retailers (Tsay & Agrawal, 2004). The impact of online 
direct channel has attracted a lot of attention throughout the years. Webb (2002) 
showed that online sale channel can decrease conflicts among channels via brand 
diferentiation and reasonable pricing strategies. Chiang, Chhajed and Hess (2003) 
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argued that the development of an online sales system can increase the ability of 
manufacturers to manage the prices of retail stores. Park and Keh (2003) demonstrated 
that manufacturers who choose online sales are financially benefited because dual 
supply chain management improves efficiency and overall performance. Cattani, 
Gilland, Heese and Swaminathan (2006) argued that manufacturers can effectively 
benefit both customers, manufacturers and retailers through proper pricing. Cai, Zhang 
and Zhang (2009) pointed out that a suitable price strategy and price promotion can 
reduce conflicts between channels, and improve the overall efficiency of the supply 
chain. Guo and Zhao (2008) studied the causes of conflicts in dual-channel supply 
chains and how to coordinate the two channels through the use of the consumer utility 
theory. Yan and Pei (2009) argued that the manufacturer's network of direct sales 
channels could improve the services of traditional retail stores, reducing market 
wholesale prices and promote the profit sharing. Chen and Liu (2010) argued that 
service competition in dual-channel supply chain assists dual-channel supply chain to 
be better than the single-channel supply chain. Especially when customers tend to 
prefer online sales channels, the profit from dual-channel supply chains increases 
Chen, Zhang and Sun (2012) pointed out that the direct selling system not only helps 
producers to reduce costs and increase profits, but also avoids the management of 
traditional chain stores costs. All of the studies show that the opening of online direct 
channels will have positive and negative impacts on manufacturers, retailers and 
consumers under different assumptions and constrains, which emphasize the 
importance of using appropriate pricing strategies to allow for the use of dual-channel 
supply chain. 
 
(2) Pricing strategy 
The pricing concept is more popular in business and has become one of the six 
pillars structure to get the highest value from the customer segment and gain the 
highest profitability (Deloitte, 2017). The six pillars are pricing strategy, advanced 
analyses and pricing, technology and data management, price execution, corporate 
governance and alignment, and tax and regulatory effectiveness. Pricing strategy is 
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defined by Deloitte as an efficient strategy that is promoted for business goals in order 
to take over the value compared to competitive alternatives and the demand of the 
customers. A comprehension of market dynamics which is established from the 
product nature, customer information and distribution plans are the framework for the 
pricing function from a fully decentralized to a fully centralized model. Therefore, in 
order to make the business grow, one of the excellent strategies is how to price the 
services. Pricing is among the strongest profit lever in the industry which is full of 
susceptibility and complexity. Montan, Kuester and Meehan (2008) showed that an 
effective price management can yield approximately 2 to 7% higher margins in 12 
months and increase the return on investment to 200 to 350%. Nevertheless, a number 
of companies have not focused on their price strategies in dual-channel supply chain 
because these shipping companies have little vision of their companies’ operations and 
understanding of the profits of their channels, assets and customers. 
Many recent researches on dual-channel supply chain tends to concentrate on 
pricing strategies. Webb and Lambe (2007) argued that price differences between 
channels could be managed within the proper range through price corridors to 
recognize price differences in the channels. Cattani, Gilland, Heese and Swaminathan, 
2006 pointed out that in order to minimize conflicts between channels, there should be 
a price strategy set out in the direct sales channel in line with the retail price of 
traditional sales channel. Kurata, Yao, and Liu (2007) included price determination in 
the environment where competition between sales channels and brands coexists. He 
figured that wholesale prices subsidy contract is an effective way to coordinate the 
supply chain. Dumrongsiri, Fan, Jain and Moinzadeh (2008) emphasized the quality 
of services and addressed the conditions for manufacturers to participate in sales 
channels and price strategies for dual-channel supply chain. Hua, Wang and Cheng 
(2010) showed that the optimal price and time can be studied through two perspectives: 
concentration and decentralization. Li, Hou, Chen and Li (2016) considered dual-
channel supply chain with a risk-averse retailer and a risk-neutral supplier and 
recommended risk-sharing contract to ensure a win-win outcome of the members in 
supply chain. Zhou, Guo and Zhou (2018) investigated pricing strategies in the dual-
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channel supply chain with service-cost sharing and free-riding. He emphasized that 
the effect of free-riding in dual-channel in differential and non-differential pricing 
scenarios, especially, when the manufactures’ online channel free-rides the retailer’s 
pre-sales services. Zhang & Wang (2018) investigated two dynamic pricing strategies 
in dual-channel supply chain with service. He argued that different pricing strategies 
will result in a disparity in stakeholder’s profits and calculated that the fixed fee 
changes when service value increases. Ranjan and Jha (2019) studied the coordination 
mechanism and pricing strategies in dual-channel supply chain with Stackelberg 
game-theoretic approach. He examined 3 models (collaboration, centralized and 
decentralized) when the manufacturers offer non-green product in offline retail 
channel and eco-friendly products in direct-channel. Dai, Wang, Liu and Wei (2019) 
investigated pricing strategies in dual-channel supply chain when the retailer concern 
about fairness and take advantage of Stackelberg game approach to determine the 
equilibrium solutions among the parameters relating to cross-price sensitivity and 
fairness.  
Many researchers have studied pricing strategies in the dual-channel with 
specific conditions under different products strategies and channel structures. All the 
mentioned researches about dual-channel supply chain and pricing strategies have 
shown that pricing strategies is crucial to coordinate channel conflict and allocate 
channel profits. In dual-channel supply chain, channel conflicts and price competition 
require the stakeholders to pay attention to profit’s distribution. This paper therefore 
attempts to applies the pricing strategy in the dual-channel supply chain into CSI. 
 
2.2.2. Game theory-based pricing strategy 
Game theories is widely used in pricing strategy in the dual-channel supply 
chain, especially the Stackelberg theory and Nash equilibrium. The game theory has 
been taken into consideration to study the interactions among a number of actors in 
the supply chain (Hennet & Arda, 2008). 
The Stackelberg theory is used to analyse the dynamic game of the decentralized 
supply chain. Both sides in the supply chain are independent in decision-making and 
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they aim at minimizing their own costs or maximizing their own benefits. The 
economist H. Von Stackelberg (Stackelberg, 1952) first introduced the Stackelberg 
game theory in 1934 in a static competition games context. Since then, this game 
theory tool has had considerable impacts on economic sciences. In this model, the 
followers observe the move of the leader’s strategic actions and start to react for profit 
maximization. In the dual-channel supply chain, Stackelberg includes manufacturer-
lead and retailer-lead. They are applied depending on the characteristics of the specific 
market and industry. A hierarchical structure between players and the decisions are 
made at different hierarchy’s levels. The interactions between the players in this 
discussion follows the structure of a Stackelberg game. There are two level-decision 
issues, which are known as bilevel optimization program and a leader-follower 
relationship among the participants. In this sense, Stackelberg game between two 
players is used to involve in processing and selling services. The fundamental obstacle 
in the model is to support the integration and coordination of information and activities 
among two agents. The pricing strategy is discussed when the retailer offers value 
added services and fairness concerns in dual-channel supply chain by the application 
of Stackelberg game (Qing-Hua & Bo, 2016). The dual-channel supply chain can be 
coordinated by the retailer’s profit share with the assumption that manufacturers acts 
as Stackelberg leader (Jing, Hui, & Ying, 2012). The impact of advertising investment 
on the pricing strategy is also studied with the application of Stackelberg game in a 
dual-channel supply chain (Huang, Yang, & Zhang, 2011). The Nash equilibrium and 
Stackelberg equilibrium are both discussed with price discount contracts between 
manufacturers and retailers (Gangshu Cai, 2009). Thus, research on the dual channel 
supply chain also makes use of both Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium for pricing 
strategy in their studies such as Lu and Liu (2013), Radhi and Zhang (2018) and 
Taleizadeh, Alizadeh-Basban and Sarker (2018). 
Nash equilibrium is the concept of game theory in which “the optimal outcome 
of a game is where there is no incentive to deviate from their initial strategy” (Kopalle 
& Shumsky, 2012). In other words, hypothetically when the other opponents stay the 
same with the strategies, the player has no increasing benefit from changing his action. 
 28
One game can have many Nash equilibrium or none of it. The Nash equilibrium is in 
the game with more than two strategic players where the players take consideration of 
the opponents’ choices. The Nash equilibrium is achieved when the player has no 
incentive to switch his strategy considering the other participants’ decisions. All the 
players achieve a win-win situation. Recent researches have successfully applied this 
game theory as a common methodology in coordination between stakeholders and 
pricing strategy in supply chain management (Zhang, Wang, & Wang, 2016; Zhao, 
Atkins, Hu, & Zhang, 2017; Chen et al., 2018; Radhi & Zhang, 2018). For example, 
Chen et al., (2018) studied reserve logistics with an environmentally conscious 
customer in the green supply chain. By comparing two pricing strategies in three 
different game models, he concluded that customer environmental awareness 
positively impacts revenues.  
 
2.2.3. Consumer utility theory-based pricing strategy 
Demand functions are the basis for derivation of profit functions. The consumer 
utility functions are widely used to derive demand functions in the dual-channel supply 
chain. The consumer utility theory is applied to deduce the demand function, based on 
which pricing strategy of the manufacturer in the dual-channel supply chain is put 
forwarded (Cattani, Gilland, Heese, & Swaminathan, 2006). Moreover, whether the 
manufacturer should adopt consistent pricing is discussed too. The pricing strategy 
with consideration of product characteristics, consumer preference and consumer 
utility theory is studied (Dumrongsiri, Fan, Jain, & Moinzadeh, 2008). In addition, the 
research shows that the supply chain system has an equilibrium solution only when 
the sales cost on the retail channel is in a certain range. Chen, Kaya and Özer (2008) 
applied the theory of consumer utility to study the two-channel pricing strategy under 
service competition. The service level of manufacturer's direct channel is determined 
by the delivery time, and that of the retailer's traditional channel is determined by the 
service level of the manufacturer's direct channel. Moreover, retailers are compared 
with each other to illustrates that retailers in the dual-channel supply chain have more 
advantages. With the application of the consumer utility theory, the impact of Internet 
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channel entry on the channel members are studied deeply under various mixed channel 
structures (Yoo & Lee, 2011). The consumer utility theory is found in a great deal of 
recent research on the supply chain (Li, Chen, Xu, & Hou, 2018; Wang, Leng, Song, 
Luo, & Hui, 2019).  
 
2.3. Pricing strategy in the dual-channel supply chain in the container 
shipping industry 
Container shipping enterprises have been keen on using pricing as a profit lever. 
Cost-plus pricing is traditionally ingrained in the industry, which currently becomes 
ineffective due to the volatility nature of shipping market. The market keeps raising; 
however, industry players have become more cautious with little capitalization on this 
growth. Shipping companies struggle to alter their rates in accordance with market 
fluctuations or immediately innovate priced offers to their services’ portfolio. Several 
shipping companies have coped with the challenges by cutting costs. However, cost 
cutting allows for small financial gains with every rounds of the cuts. Eventually, 
additional cuts reach a point where they become ineffective. Therefore, shipping 
companies have considered to change their strategy from cost cutting to growth. 
Growth is challenging when the market is full of uncertainties; nevertheless, 
opportunities lie in every proper strategy. There are a few articles concerning the 
pricing strategy in CSI with focus on the revenue management in the pure offline retail 
channel. An analytic discount model with single or multiple price-break points has 
been designed to maximize the carriers’ and forwarders/NVOCCs’ profits (Yin & 
Kim, 2012), and numerical experiments have been made to verify the effectiveness of 
the quantity discount schemes. A fundamental revenue management model concerning 
capacity control and pricing models was developed for CSI with the reference to the 
revenue management application for air transportation (Meng, Zhao, & Wang, 2019). 
Most scholars as a result do not pay enough attention to impacts of the online direct 
channel to the pricing strategy under the dual-channel selling structure in CSI. There 
are just two articles concerning the dual-channel supply chain in CSI, and both of them 
focus on the optimization of slot allocation. One of them addresses the issue and tries 
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to optimize the slot allocations in the dual-channel supply chain (Hu, Li, & Yang, 
2016). The optimization of slot allocation for container shipping companies is 
discussed under e-commerce environment (Hu, Huang, & Zhao, 2019). It is concluded 
that the total revenue of a container shipping company can be improved through the 
improvement of online predictability and stability. 
 
2.4. Summary 
The gaps between the current studies and questions are summarized as follows: 
(1) There is no quantitative research concerning the impacts of e-commerce on the 
stakeholder in CSI. Most of the articles only discuss the impacts qualitatively. (2) 
There is no research concerning the pricing strategy for container shipping companies 
in the dual-channel supply chain.  
The dissertation innovates to address the gaps about applying the pricing strategy 
in the dual-channel supply chain in CSI and discusses the impacts of e-commerce in 
CSI quantitatively; some of the previous mentioned theories are used in the 
dissertation.   
(1) Only the decentralized dual-channel supply chain is discussed due to the 
reality in the current CSI. Container shipping companies and NVOCC/freight 
forwarders do not cooperate with each other with regard to online and offline pricing. 
They only aim to maximize their own profits, not the profit of the whole supply chain.  
(2) Nash equilibrium theory is applied in the dissertation considering the market 
characteristics in CSI. The authors assume the wholesale price is decided by the market 
because  CSI is regarded as an oligopoly market (Rau & Spinler, 2016; Sys, 2009). 
Therefore, container shipping companies and NVOCC/freight forwarders are assumed 
to set the online direct price and offline retail price separately, respectively, and 
separately at the same time. Furthermore, they comprehend each other’s best strategy 
before taking actions. There are no leader and follower between container shipping 
companies and NVOCC/freight forwarders. 
 (3) The consumer utility theory is also applied in this dissertation to derive the 






Chapter 3 : METHOD 
 
In this section, the factors that influences the pricing strategy and profits in the 
dual-channel supply chain are discussed. Then, a conceptual dual-channel supply 
chain in CSI and model framework with objectives, inputs, outputs, and assumptions 
are established. In addition, the prices and profits models for container shipping 
companies and Non-Vessel Operating Common Carrier (NVOCC)/freight forwarders 
in the conceptualized supply chain are constructed. Finally, the existence of optimal 
online direct price, optimal offline retail price and Nash equilibrium results are verified, 
and the equations of optimal online direct price, optimal offline retail price and Nash 
equilibrium results are derived. All the steps of model construction and optimization 














Figure 8. Steps of models’ construction and optimization 
Models Construction 
 Profit functions for container shipping company and NVOCC/freight forwarder 
Optimal online direct and offline retail prices, the profits of container shipping 
company and NVOCC/freight forwarder 
Nash equilibrium results of optimal online direct and offline retail prices, 
the profits of container shipping company and NVOCC/freight forwarder 
Model framework with objectives, inputs, outputs and assumptions 
Optimization of profits respectively 
In a decentralized dual-channel supply chain 
Modified conceptual dual-channel supply chain in the container shipping industry 
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3.1. The factors influencing the pricing strategy and profits in the dual-
channel supply chain 
The main factors that influence the pricing strategy and profits in the dual-
channel supply chain differ from study to study as research on pricing strategy has 
shown (see Figure 9) (Kienzler & Kowalkowski, 2017). It is difficult to list all the 
factors that influence the pricing strategy and profits in the dual-channel supply chain; 




Figure 9. Key developments in pricing strategy research, 1995–2016. 
Source: Kienzler & Kowalkowski (2017) 
 
1. The risk preferences of stakeholders in dual-channel supply chain 
The stakeholders in the supply chain have different risk appetites because they 
have different company backgrounds and their managers have different ideas. The 
stakeholders are normally categorized into two groups: risk seeking preferences and 
risk-averse preferences (Pennings & Smidts, 2000). The risk preferences of 
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stakeholders play a vital role in the pricing strategy in the supply chain because the 
risk-averse stakeholders focus on stability while the risk-seeking stakeholders seek 
high return. Therefore, there are some articles studying the impact of stakeholders’ 
different risk preferences on the pricing strategy in the supply chain (Q. Chen, Wang, 
Yu, & Tsai, 2018; Huo, Guo, & Cheng, 2019; J. Wang & Zhang, 2015). The articles, 
without consideration of the risk preferences, normally assumed all the stakeholders 
in the supply chain are risk neutral. 
 
2. The manufacturer’s cost 
The profit of the manufacturer in the dual-channel supply chain has two sources: 
online direct channel and offline retail channel. The profits on different channels are 
both determined by the respective unit cost and unit-selling price. 
The unit costs are different between online direct and offline retail channels. The 
first reason is that the online direct channel can save administration costs compared 
with the offline retail channel for manufacturers. The administration costs consist of 
wages for planning, booking, documentation, information and communication 
technology, and office labor management. The second reason is the online unit cost is 
dynamic. The investment and sales effort spent on online direct channels are changing 
in different stages of e-commerce evolvement. As discussed in the first section, 
manufacturers normally cannot benefit from the technology evolution and e-
commerce immediately. The manufacturers who act as the pioneers at the e-commerce 
emergent stage inevitably evolve huge investments on the new technology, IT system, 
online website, human resources costs, know-how knowledge cost, the promotion on 
online platform and so forth.  
On the other hand, the selling prices differ between online and offline channels. 
The offline unit-selling price offered by manufacturer to retailer is called the wholesale 
price. The online unit-selling price offered by manufacturer to consumers directly is 
named as the online direct price. The question of how to set the wholesale price, the 
online direct price and the offline retail price to maximize the profit of manufacturer 
in dual-channel supply chain attracts the attention of many researchers. 
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3. The retailer’s cost  
The profit of the retailer in the dual-channel supply chain comes solely from the 
offline retail channel. It is determined by the retailer’s cost and offline retail price. The 
retailer’s cost mainly includes the wholesale price offered by the manufacture, which 
is the discussed hot topic by many researchers. The way to set the wholesale price 
differs in various industry sectors with different market structures, pricing powers of 
the stakeholders in supply chain and so forth. The wholesale price can be directly 
determined by market, manufacturer, and retailer, or negotiated by two parties.  
 
4. Market structure and the relationship between manufacture and retailer 
There are four kinds of market structures: perfect competition, monopolistic 
competition, oligopoly and monopoly (Stackelberg, 2010). Each market structure has 
specific characteristics that influences the company decision-making and pricing 
strategy. Different market structure also leads to different relationships and order of 
actions between manufacturers and retailers, which is vital to the pricing strategy and 
profits in the dual-channel structure. As discussed in chapter 2, the game theory, which 
includes the manufacturer-lead Stackelberg model, retailer-lead Stackelberg model 
and Nash equilibrium model, has been widely applied to discuss the pricing strategy 
and profits in the dual-channel supply chain according to the different market 
structures and characteristics of industries.  
 
5. Consumer demand 
Consumer demand is an inevitable factor when discussing the pricing strategy 
and profits in the dual-channel supply chain. The assumption of consumers’ demand 
differs in various studies. The consumers’ demand is mostly assumed into stochastic 
demand or certain demand (Vahdani & Ahmadzadeh, 2019; L. Wang & Song, 2019). 
If the consumers’ demand is stochastic, the study also has to verify the distribution of 




6. Consumer preference for online direct channel  
It is inevitable to discuss consumer preference for the online direct channel in 
the dual-channel supply chain when studying the pricing strategy and profits. 
Consumer preference for the online direct channel is also dynamic in different stages 
of e-commerce evolvement. There are several articles studying the main determinants 
of consumer preference for the online direct channel. The online transaction cost, asset 
specificity and uncertainty of selling structure, time responsiveness, personalization, 
security, and reliability of online shopping platform are strongly related to consumer 
preference for the online direct channel from behavioral and economic perspectives 
(Devaraj, Fan, & Kohli, 2006). It has also been shown that trust, perceived ease of use, 
perceived usefulness and enjoyment are the influencing factors (Chiu, Chang, Cheng, 
& Fang, 2009). Based on these studies, the consumer preference for the online direct 
channel is considered as an influencing factor of pricing strategy and profits in the 
dual-channel supply chain (Mujkić, Qorri, & Kraslawski, 2018; Yoo & Lee, 2011; Yu, 
Shi, & Fang, 2019). 
 
7. Consumers’ valuation of product 
The willingness-to-pay price of consumers is determined by the consumers’ 
perfect valuation of the product utility and the their preference to the selling channel 
(Chiang, Chhajed, & Hess, 2003). It is the direct influencing factors for the pricing 
strategy and profits of manufacturer and retailer. The consumers will give up the 
purchasing if they have to pay more than their estimated valuation of the product. 
 
8. Consumer purchase cost 
The consumer purchase cost discussed here means the customers’ effort required 
for obtaining the tangible physical goods or intangible service (Cattani, Gilland, 
Heese, & Swaminathan, 2006). It consists of online purchase cost and offline purchase 
cost. It is put forward that the online channel only exists when it can reduce the 
customers’ transaction cost (Coughlan, Anderson, Stern, & El-Ansary, 2006). With 
reference to the transaction cost theory, the consumer’s purchase cost includes the 
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search and information costs, bargaining costs and policing and enforcement costs 
(Williamson, 1993). On both the online direct and offline retail channels, the consumer 
purchase costs are controlled and perceived by consumers and third party and the 
details of consumer purchase cost are listed as follows (Rui, 2011): (1) Cost for buying 
the essential asset; (2) Learning cost in negotiation, especially on offline retail channel; 
(3) Searching cost that happened on both channels. (4) Time cost spent from the 
beginning to the end of transaction; (5) Risk cost due to the uncertainty and incomplete 
information during the transaction.  
 
9. The characteristics of goods 
The pricing strategy are different in a service supply chain because the 
manufacturer and retailer sell intangible services, not the physical commodities (. 
Wang, Wallace, Shen, & Choi, 2015). For example, there is no inventory cost for the 
manufacturer in the service supply chain, while the inventory management is a key 
topic in the supply chain of physical commodities. Even for all tangible physical 
commodities, the supply chain management is not the same. For example, perishable 
products have  a special pricing strategy because the price is closely related to the 
freshness, and normally there is a recovery contract between manufacturer and retailer 
(Kouki, Babai, & Minner, 2018; Tao, Zhang, Peng, Shi, & Shi, 2019). For the 
emergency products, the main aim of the supply chain is to make sure that delivery is 
on time and reliable, not to maximize the profits or minimize the cost (Ben Othman, 
Zgaya, Dotoli, & Hammadi, 2017). 
 
10. The characteristics of the supply chain 
The pricing strategy and profits are very different in a decentralized and 
centralized dual-channel supply chain. In a decentralized supply chain, the 
stakeholders in the supply chain aim to maximize their own profits while in a 
centralized supply chain, the stakeholders aim to maximize the profits of the whole 
supply chain and make sure that their own profits are not worsened. Their actions are 
coordinated by various coordination contracts. In the centralized supply chain, there 
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are many articles which show how manufacturers coordinate with retailers under the 
dual-channel. The relationship of a linear price and revenue sharing between two 
channels is established to coordinate the supply chain (Cai, 2010). A discount contract 
has been verified to be a useful tool to coordinate the supply chain too (Cai, Zhang, & 
Zhang, 2009). A coordinate agreement is established to achieve win-win result in a 
certain condition under which both suppliers and retailers prefer a dual-channel supply 
chain (Chen, Zhang, & Sun, 2012). The profit-sharing contract between supplier and 
buyer is suggested to coordinate the channel conflicts (Yan, 2008). 
 
3.2. The modified conceptual dual-channel supply chain in the container 
shipping industry 
The conceptual dual-channel supply chain in CSI contains one container shipping 
company and one NVOCC/Freight Forwarder. The manufacturer opens an online 
direct channel where the container slot can be sold directly to cargo owners as shown 
in Figure 10. However, the traditional conceptual dual-channel supply chain (see 
Figure 7) cannot be applied directly in CSI. Therefore, the modifications and 
explanations of the conceptual dual-channel supply chain in CSI are listed as follows:  
a. The container shipping company is regarded as manufacturer, though the 
container shipping company does not manufacture any physical commodities. The 
inventory cost is not considered as modification in the models for pricing strategy and 
profits because the shipping service sold by container shipping companies cannot be 
stored. 
b. An NVOCC/freight forwarder is regarded as a retailer. The inventory cost is 
also not considered for NVOCC/freight forwarders as modification for the models of 
pricing strategy and profits. Furthermore, the distance between the NVOCC/freight 
forwarder and the cargo owner is not considered when discussing the offline consumer 
purchase cost. The reason is that the shipping service is provided directly by container 











Offline retail channel  
Online direct channel  
 
Figure 10. Conceptual dual-channel supply chain in CSI 
 
3.3. Constructing models 
After discussing the influencing factors and structuring the dual-channel supply 
chain in CSI, the model framework with objectives, inputs, outputs and assumptions 
are firstly constructed in this section. The models are established based on the 
framework, and the model construction has two steps. In the first step, the consumer 
utility functions for online direct and offline retail channels will be constructed based 
on the consumer purchase cost, consumer preference and choice theory. Then the 
demand functions for online direct and offline retail channels and profits functions for 
container shipping companies and NVOCC/freight forwarders are derived accordingly. 








Figure 11. Steps of model construction 
 
Container Shipping Company 
NVOCC /Freight Forwarder 
Cargo Owners 
Demand functions for online 
direct and offline retail 
channel 
Profits functions for container shipping company and NVOCC/freight forwarder 
Consumer utility functions for online 
direct and offline retail channel 
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3.3.1. Model framework: objectives, inputs, outputs and assumptions 
1. Model objective 
This dissertation discusses the pricing strategy and profits of a container 
shipping company and an NVOCC/freight forwarder only in the decentralized dual-
channel supply chain. In the decentralized supply chain, there is no cooperation 
between the container shipping company and the NVOCC/freight forwarder. The 
container shipping company and the NVOCC/freight forwarder take actions separately 
to maximize their own profits, and not the profits of the whole supply chain. Therefore, 
the objectives of models are maximizing the profits of the container shipping company 
and the NVOCC/freight forwarder.  
 
2. Model inputs 
In order to simplify the model’s construction and optimization, there are some 
influencing factors discussed (see chapter 3.1), which are considered as inputs or 
independent variables of the models in this dissertation. The specific meanings of 
selected influencing factors or independent variables in CSI are explained as follows: 
 
(1) Online and offline Consumer purchase costs in container shipping 
industry 
Combined with the contents of consumer purchase cost in chapter 3.1, the cargo 
owners face various purchase costs on both online and offline channels. The search 
costs mean the cost of looking for a container shipping service with reasonable freight 
and sound service. The bargaining costs mean the costs of negotiation. The policing 
and enforcement costs include the time and money spent to ensure the cargo is 
transported safely and timely from port of loading to port of discharging. The 
consumer purchase cost on the offline retail channel and the online direct channel are 





(2) Consumer preference for online direct channel in CSI 
Though there are no related articles discussing the consumer preference for the 
online direct channel in the container liner industry, the general findings of consumer 
preference for online direct channel in chapter 3.2 are still applicable to CSI. When 
the cargo owners’ preference for the online direct channel is increased through more 
efforts of the container shipping company, the pricing strategy and profits for the 
container shipping company and the NVOCC/freight forwarder must change 
accordingly. The consumer preference for the online direct channel in this dissertation 
is denoted as θ. 
 
(3) Container shipping company’s online and offline unit costs in CSI 
The online and offline unit costs for the container shipping company are denoted 
as c  and c , respectively. The container shippping company has different unit cost on 
online and offline channels. In addition to the reason that was put forward in chapter 
3.1, the other reasons are as follows. 
Similar to other commerical fields, costs and revenues in liner shipping 
companies are the determinants in the operational result. Due to the fierce competition 
within the sector, shipping companies have to be cost-effective to stay profitable. For 
instance, the high and low price of fuel can make the difference between loss and 
profit. Therefore, shipping companies seek to raise profits and reduce costs. There are 
six components of the cost in intercontinental container shipping, including: voyage 
costs, administration, maintenance/repair, container costs, port dues, and capital and 
insurance, as shown in Figure 12.  
E-commerce in this sense is mostly related to administration costs, consisting of 
wages for planning, booking, documentation, information and communication 
technology, office and labor management. Compared to other cost categories, 
administration accounts for 20% of total shipping costs (Stopford, 2009). In order to 
reduce costs, administration is the element that should be focused on. The Internet 
based system, therefore, is an advanced investment to reduce costs. There are several 
reasons why documentation management in CSI is challenging. Firstly, there is a lack 
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of standards. Every container shipping company has different booking systems and 
formats for their documents, especially Bill of Lading. A seamless coordination 
between parties becomes difficult due to the repeated typing and checking. Secondly, 
each container which is filled with a variety of commodities in compliance with 
different kinds of documents. It leads to the cumbersome dealing with an enormous 
quantity of documents. Thirdly, errors in documents are easy to spot. Documents that 
are exchanged between parties can meet the errors with the incomplete information or 
the conflict in the data together with the incidents with late or lost documents. 
















Figure 12. Ocean carrier cost-revenue breakdown. 
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(4) Wholesale price offered by container shipping company to 
NVOCC/freight forwarder  
The wholesale price which is offered by the container shipping company to the 
NVOCC/freight forwarder decides the container shipping company’s offline revenue 
directly. Moreover, the wholesale price offered by the container shipping company to 
the NVOCC/freight forwarder is the main cost of the NVOCC/freight forwarder and 
the only considered cost for NVOCC/freight forwarder in this dissertation. The 
wholesale price which is offered by the container shipping company to the 
NVOCC/freight forwarder is denoted as w. 
 
(5) Consumers’ valuation of container shipping service in CSI 
As discussed in chapter 3.1, the consumers’ valuation means cargo owners’ 
perfect estimated valuation of the product, which should be substantially greater than 
the selling price. The consumers’ valuation of shipping service in CSI is denoted as v. 
 
3. Model outputs 
This dissertation aims to find the Nash equilibrium of online direct and offline 
retail prices for the two players in the conceptual dual-channel supply chain in CSI, 
the container shipping company and the NVOCC/freight forwarder. All the following 
Nash equilibrium the results of models are put as the outputs. The Nash equilibrium 
results consist of optimal online direct price (denoted	as	p ), optimal online direct 
price (denoted	as	p ), profit of the container shipping company (denoted	as	π ), 
profit of the NVOCC/freight forwarder (denoted	as	π ), the market demand for 
online direct channel (denoted	as	Q ) and the market demand for offline retail 
channel (denoted	as	Q ). 
 
4. Assumptions 
In order to construct the models, assumptions are essential besides the objectives, 
inputs and outputs. The assumption for the dual-channel supply chain in CSI are 
concluded as follows. 
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(1) The dual-channel supply chain in CSI only considers one container shipping 
company and one NVOCC/freight forwarder. 
(2) The wholesale price w offered by the container shipping company to the 
NVOCC/freight forwarder is assumed given and decided by the container freight 
market. The main reason is that the CSI is considered as an oligopoly market and the 
degree of oligopoly differs in different routes (Rau & Spinler, 2016; Sys, 2009). There 
are four different pricing models in the oligopoly market: Stackelberg model, price 
leadership model, Cournot Model and Bertrand Model. In the first model, the dominant 
container shipping companies can decide the capacity and freight rate, and other 
container shipping companies will follow. In the second model, one single container 
shipping company has a dominant market share (Jinhai, Siqin, & Ye, 2011). Both of 
the first two models are not applicable in CSI. The last two models are used to analyze 
the market with two container shipping companies, which cannot be applied in this 
dissertation because only one container shipping company is considered in the supply 
chain. Therefore, the wholesale price offered by the container shipping company to 
the retailer is considered as given and decided by the market. 
(3) The dual-channel supply chain in CSI is a decentralized supply chain. There 
is no cooperation between the container shipping company and the NVOCC/freight 
forwarder. The container shipping company and the NVOCC/freight forwarder set 
online direct price and offline retail price at the same time and separately in order to 
maximize their own profits respectively. This is the current situation in reality. 
(4) Assuming that the online direct price should be greater than the wholesale 
price offered by the container shipping company to the NVOCC/freight forwarder 
(w P ), otherwise the NVOCC/freight forwarder will purchase directly from online 
direct channel and the offline retail channel will not exist finally.  
The notations of all the variables and the model framework in this dissertation are 





Table 2. Notations 
b  Offline consumer purchase cost in 
container shipping industry 
p  Nash equilibrium of optimal 
offline retail price 
b  Online consumer purchase cost in 
container shipping industry 
p  Nash equilibrium of optimal 
online direct price 
θ Consumer preference for online direct 
channel in container shipping industry
π  Nash equilibrium of profit 
of container shipping 
company 
c  Container shipping company’s 
onlilne unit cost  
π  Nash equilibrium of profit 
of NVOCC/freight 
forwarder 
c  Container shipping company’s offline 
unit cost 
Q  The market demand for 
offline retail channel 
w Wholesale price offered by container 
shipping company to NVOCC/freight 
forwarder 
Q  The market demand for 
online direct channel 
v Consumers’ valuation of container 































Figure 13. Model framework 
 
3.3.2. The profit models for container shipping company and 
NVOCC/freight forwarder 
Based on the model framework (see Figure 13) the consumer utility functions 
for online direct and offline retail channels will be discussed firstly based on the 
consumer purchase cost, consumer preference and choice theory. Then the profit 
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Objectives 
Maximizing the profits of container shipping 
company and NVOCC/freight forwarder 
respectively 
Models of profits of 




1. Functions of online and offline consumer purchase cost 
(1) Offline consumer purchase cost 
With reference to the Hotelling Model, it is assumed that the NVOCC/freight 
forwarder is located in the origin whilst cargo owners are uniformly distributed in the 
interval [0, 1] on the X-axis. The uniform distribution density equals one (N 1) as 
illustrated in Figure 14 (Hotelling, 1990). The offline consumer purchase cost differs 
when the cargo owners locate on different points on the X-axis. 
Being different with the original model, the physical distance is replaced with 
the relation distance as the meaning of X-axis. In CSI, the NVOCC/freight forwarder 
acts as intermediator and the container shipping service is provided directly by 
container shipping companies (Wang et al., 2015). The offline consumer purchase cost 
in CSI is almost not related with the physical distance between the NVOCC/freight 
forwarder and cargo owners. In reality, the container shipment cannot be conducted 
only by seaborne transportation. The other supporting logistic activities are essential 
to support the container shipment, such as customs clearance, hinterland transportation, 
container loading and unloading. The NVOCC/freight forwarder not only sells the 
container shipping service, but also provides the other supporting logistic activities to 
cargo owners as additional service to improve the stability of the relationship with 
cargo owners. The relationship between the NVOCC/freight forwarder and the cargo 
owners correlates with the number of additional services that can be offered by the 
NVOCC/freight forwarder. Being closer to the NVOCC/freight forwarder in the model 
(see Figure 14), cargo owners enjoy higher stability trust with the NVOCC/freight 
forwarder and lower offline purchase cost. The reason is that the higher stability of the 
relationship can save cargo owners’ search and information costs, bargaining costs and 
enforcement costs because of the lower uncertainty and risks in this transaction. What 
is more, the total quantity of cargo owners is assumed as one (N 1) and it is assumed 
that each cargo owner buys one-unit container shipping service every time.  
A linear cost function is applied to describe the offline purchase cost of cargo 
owners, and b  is used as the cost coefficient. Therefore, the offline purchase cost for 










Figure 14. Consumer distribution.  
Reproduced from “Stability in competition” by Hotelling, 1990. 
 
(2) Online consumer purchase cost 
It is assumed the cargo owners almost enjoy the same online consumer purchase 
cost. The reason is that the online consumer purchase cost is not influenced by the 
physical distance or relation distance between the cargo owners and container shipping 
company in the same region. Being different with the NVOCC/freight forwarder, the 
container shipping company only provides the seaborne transportation to cargo owners. 
The cargo owners can enjoy better price transparency on the online direct channel 
because of the homogeneous service. Being different with the offline consumer 
purchase cost, the online consumer purchase cost b  is assumed as a constant. 
 
2. Functions of online and offline consumer utility 
The consumer preference for the offline retail channel equals to one in this 
dissertation, and the consumer preference for online direct channel θ is assumed to 
equal or less than one (θ 1) and regarded as the comparative acceptance of the 
online direct channel (Chuan-yong, 2009).  The reason for assuming θ 1 is because 
cargo owners are expected to stay on the offline retail channel for a long time. The 
relationship between the NVOCC/freight forwarder and cargo owner is regarded to be 
stable in the current situation because the NVOCC/freight forwarder offers other 
supporting logistic services to cargo owners. Accordingly, the consumers’ valuation 
of the unit container shipping service on the online direct channel is expressed as θv 
Relation Distance 




(Chiang et al., 2003). Consumer utility means what the cargo owners gain from 
purchasing the container shipping service. Consumer utility in CSI equals consumers’ 
valuation of unit container shipping service minus the costs they paid including the 
container freight and the purchase costs (Chiang et al., 2003). Therefore, the functions 
of the consumer’s utility on the offline retail channel and online direct channel are 
expressed as equation 3.1 and 3.2 respectively.  
u v p b x                                                                                                     (3.1) 
u θv p b                                                                                                      (3.2) 
The cargo owners make the decision of purchasing only when the utility is non-
negative and select the selling channel with greater utility in the dual-channel supply 
chain in CSI. 
 
3. The models of profits for container shipping company and 
NVOCC/freight forwarder 
For the NVOCC/freight forwarder, the profit only comes from the offline retail 
channel. The unit of profit for the NVOCC/freight forwarder equals offline retail price 
p  minus the wholesale price offered by the container shipping company w. Therefore, 
the total profit for the NVOCC/freight forwarder equals the unit of profit times the 
market demand for offline retail channel Q , as expressed in equation 3.3.   
For the container shipping company, the profit comes from both online direct 
and offline retail channels. On the offline retail channel, the unit profit equals 
wholesale price w minus the offline unit cost c . Accordingly, the offline profit for the 
container shipping company equals the unit of profit times the market demand for 
offline retail channel Q ; On the online direct channel, the unit profit equals the online 
direct price p  minus the online unit cost c . Accordingly, the online profit for the 
container shipping company equals the unit profit times the market demand for the 
online direct channel Q . Therefore, the total profit of the container shipping company 
is the sum of online profit and offline profit, as shown in equation 3.4.   
							π p w Q                                                                                                              (3.3) 
π w c Q p c Q                                                                                (3.4) 
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The total profits of the dual-channel supply chain are the sum of container 
shipping company’s profit and NVOCC/freight forwarder’s profit, as presented in 
equation 3.5. 
π π π p c Q p c Q                                                               (3.5) 
The following optimization is conducted with the objective to maximize the 
profits of the container shipping company and the NVOCC/freight forwarder, 
respectively. 
 
3.4. Derivation of optimal online direct and offline retail prices 
Though the final outputs in this dissertation is to find the Nash equilibrium results 
of online direct and offline retail prices, the respective function of optimal online direct 
price and optimal offline retail prices have to be derived first. The reason is the Nash 
equilibrium results are the intersection points of the container shipping company's 
function of optimal online direct price and the NVOCC/freight forwarder's function of 
optimal offline retail price. 
 
3.4.1. Optimal offline retail price NVOCC/freight forwarder 
The NVOCC/freight forwarder’s function of optimal offline retail price differs 
under different scenarios, as discussed in the following section. In the first scenario, 
the cargo owners only exist on the offline retail channel. In the second scenario, cargo 
owners exist on both online direct and offline retail channels. 
 
1. Scenario 1: the cargo owners only exist on offline retail channel 
When online consumer utility is negative ( d dp v b  ), the cargo owners will 
give up the online direct channel and choose the traditional offline channel. The 
demand for online direct channel equals zero in this scenario (Q 0). On the offline 
retail channel, the cargo owners purchase only when they can obtain positive offline 
consumer utility (u 0, or p v b ).   
According to equation 3.1 and Figure 14, the cargo owner who has the greatest 
offline purchase cost is located in the point of one (x=1). They suffer the greatest 
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offline purchase cost b  and enjoy the lowest offline consumer utility, which equals 
the offline consumers’ valuation of unit container shipping service v   minus the 
greatest offline purchase cost b  (v b ). 
If the offline retail price p  is greater than the wholesale price w and lower than 
the lowest offline consumer utility (v b ), it means that all the cargo owners will 
purchase the contianer shipping service through the offline retail channel because all 
of them can get positive utility. 
If the offline retail price p  is greater than the lowest offline consumer utility 
(v b ), only the cargo owners located between zero and (v b /	p  (see Figure 14) 
can obtain positive utility.  
Accordingly, the demand functions for the offline retail channel under 
previously mentioned two constrains are derived as equation 3.6.  
1,
( ) / ,
r r
r
r r r r
w p v b
Q
v p b v b p v
  
                                                                                 (3.6) 
After applying the demand functions (equation 3.6) into the profit function 
(equation 3.3), the profit function of the NVOCC/freight forwarder in this scenario is 
derived as equation 3.7. 
)( ) / ,
r r r
r
r r r r r
p w w p v b
p w v p b v b p v
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（
                                                               (3.7) 
 
The objective of the NVOCC/freight forwarder is to maximize his own profit. 
Before finding the optimal offline retail price to maximize the profit of the 
NVOCC/freight forwarder, it has to be verified whether the maximum profit of the 
NVOCC/freight forwarder exists. The results of first-order and second-order partial 
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                                                                                 (3.9) 
As shown in equation 3.9, the second-order partial derivatives with respect to p  
are non-positive, which means the maximum profit of the NVOCC/freight forwarder 
denoted as	π ∗ exists. The optimal offline retail price denoted as p ∗ can be obtained 


























                                                                                  (3.10) 
 
2. Scenario 2: cargo owners exist on both offline and online direct channels 
When online consumer utility is non-negative ( d dp v b  ), the cargo owners 
will not give up the online direct channel and choose the selling channel with greater 
consumer utility between online and offline channels. For example, cargo owners will 
select the offline retail channel when they can obtain greater offline consumer utility 
than the online direct channel  
( r r r d d du v p b x u v p b        or [(1 ) ] /d d r rx v p b p b     ).  
If [(1 ) ] /d d r rv p b p b     is greater than one, x  is definetily less than 
[(1 ) ] /d d r rv p b p b    , which means all the cargo owners select the offline retail 
channel and demand for the offline retail channel Q  equals one. 
If [(1 ) ] /d d r rv p b p b     is less than one, only the cargo owners located 
between zero and [(1 ) ] /d d r rv p b p b    (see Figure 14) can obtain positive utility.  
Accordingly, the demand functions for the offline retail channel under 
previously mentioned two constrains are derived as equation 3.11.  
1, (1- )
[(1- ) ] / , (1- )
r d r d
r
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    
         
                             (3.11) 
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After applying the demand functions (equation 3.11) into the profit function 
(equation 3.3), the profit function of the NVOCC/freight forwarder in this scenario is 
derived as equation 3.12. 
(1- )
)[(1- ) ] / , (1- )
r r d r d
r
r d r d r d r d r
p w w p v b b p
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Being similar with scenario 1, the results of first-order and second-order partial 
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                                                         (3.14) 
As presented in equation 3.14, the second-order partial derivatives with respect 
to p  are non-positive, which means the maximum profit of the NVOCC/freight 
forwarder exists. The optimal offline retail price can be obtained as equation 3.15 after 












d r d d r d
d d d r d
r




ww v b p v v b b p v
 
 
       







                           (3.15) 
 
3.4.2. Optimal online direct price for container shipping company 
Being similar with the NVOCC/freight forwarder, the container shipping 
company’s function of optimal online direct price also differs under different scenarios 
as discussed below. In the first scenario, cargo owners only exist on the offline retail 
channel. In the second scenario, cargo owners exist on both online direct and offline 
retail channels. In the third scenario, cargo owners exist only on the online direct 
channel. 
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1. Scenario 1: the cargo owners only exist on online direct channel 
The cargo owners will choose the online direct channel only when the online 
consumer utility is greater than the maximum offline consumer utility. The maximum 
offline consumer utility happens when the relation distance x (see Figure 14) equals 
zero ( x=0), and it is expressed as r ru v p  . Therefore, the condition that cargo 
owners only select the online direct channel can be expressed as 
r r d d du v p u v p b       or (1- )d r dp p v b   . In this scenario, the demand 
for the online direct channel equals one, and the demand for the offline retail channel 
equals zero, as expressed in equation 3.16 and 3.17. 
					Q 0, (1- )d r dp p v b                                                                                            (3.16) 
Q 1,			 (1- )d r dp p v b                                                                                      (3.17) 
After applying the demand functions (equation 3.6 and 3.7) into the profit 
function (equation 3.4), the profit function of the container shipping company, denoted 
as π , is derived as equation 3.18. The profit function for the container shipping 
company increases with the online direct price in this scenario. 
π p c , (1- )d r dp p v b                                                                              (3.18) 
 
2. Scenario 2: the cargo owners exist on both online direct and offline retail 
channels 
As discussed in scenario 1, the maximum offline consumer utility is expressed as 
r ru v p  . Similarly, the minimum offline consumer utility occurs when the relation 
distance x (see Figure 14) equals 1 ( x=1), and it is expressed as r r ru v p b   . 
When the online consumer utility exists between the maximum offline consumer 
utility and minimum offline consumer utility, cargo owners exist on both online direct 
and offline retail channels. This condition can be expressed as
r r d d d rv p b u v p b v p         or (1- ) (1- )r d d r d rp v b p p v b b        . 
When deriving the online and offline demand functions, there are two situations 
that needs to be considered, as outlined below. 
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(1) The minimum offline consumer utility is greater than zero 
The situation that minimum offline consumer utility is greater than zero is 
expressed as = 0r r ru v p b    or r rp v b  . In this situation, all the cargo owners 
can obtain positive utility through the offline retail channel. 
When facing online direct and offline retail channels, cargo owners will select 
the selling channel with higher consumer utility. The offline and online consumer 
utilities are same when r r d dv p b x v p b      or [(1- ) ] /d r d rx v b p p b     
is satisfied, which means the cargo owners located at the point
[(1- ) ] /d r d rx v b p p b     have same online and offline comsumers’ untilites. For 
the cargo owners located between zero and [(1- ) ] /d r d rx v b p p b    , the offline 
consumer utility is greater than online consumer utility, and they will select the offline 
retail channel. Simillarly, for the cargo owners located between 
[(1- ) ] /d r d rx v b p p b     and one, the online consumer utility is greater than 
offline consumer utility, and they will select the online direct channel. Accordingly, 
the demand functions for offline and online direct channels are derived as equation 
3.19 and 3.20 when conditions (1- ) (1- )r d d r d rp v b p p v b b         and 
r rp v b   are both satisfied. 
[(1- ) ] /r d r d rQ v b p p b                                                                                       (3.19) 
1-[(1- ) ] /d d r d rQ v b p p b                                                                             (3.20) 
After applying the demand functions (equation 3.19 and 3.20) into the profit 
function (equation 3.4), the profit function for the container shipping company in this 
scenario is derived as equation 3.21.  
) + )(1 )= )[(1- ) ]/ + )(1 [(1- ) ]/ )m r r d d r r d r d r d d d r d rw c Q p c Q w c v b p p b p c v b p p b              （ （ （ （      
                                                       (3.21) 
The objective of the container shipping company is to maximize his own profit. 
Similarly, it has to be verified whether the maximum profit of the container shipping 
company exists first. The results of first-order and second-order partial derivative with 
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                                                                                                                   (3.23) 
As presented in equation 3.19, the second-order partial derivatives with respect 
to p  are non-positive, which means the the maximum profit of the container shipping 
company exists. The optimal online direct price, denoted as  p ∗ can be obtained as 







2 d r d rd r
v w v b b c c pp                                                                      (3.24) 
 
(2) The minimum offline consumer utility is lower than zero 
The situation that minimum offline consumer utility is lower than zero is 
expressed as = 0r r ru v p b    or r rp v b  . In this situation, the condition for the 
existence of online direct channel is the cargo owners can get positive online consumer 
utility, and the condition can be expressed as 0 =d d du v p b    or d d
p v b   . 
When the conditions that (1- ) (1- )r d d r d rp v b p p v b b        , r rp v b   
and d dp v b   are all satisfied, the demand function for offline retail channel, the 
demand function for online direct channel and the function of optimal online direct 
price are same with the results in first situation, and they are derived as same as 
equations 3.19, 3.20 and 3.24 respectively. 
[(1- ) ] /r d r d rQ v b p p b                                                                                     (3.19) 
1-[(1- ) ] /d d r d rQ v b p p b                                                                                   (3.20) 
 * 1
2 d r d r rd




3. Scenario 3: the cargo owners exist only on offline retail channels 
The cargo owners will choose the offline retail channel only when the minimum 
offline consumer utility is greater than online consumer utility. The minimum offline 
consumer utility occurs when the relation distance x (see Figure 14) equals one ( x
=0), and it is expressed as r r ru v p b   . Therefore, the condition that cargo owners 
only select the offline retail channel can be expressed as 
r r r d d du v p b u v p b        or (1- )d r d rp p v b b    . In this scenario, the 
demand for online direct channel equals zero as expressed in equation 3.25, and the 
demand for offline retail channel equals one. 
						Q 0                                                                                                               (3.25) 
After applying the demand function (equation 3.25) into the profit function 
(equation 3.4), the profit function for the container shipping company in this scenario 
is derived as equation 3.26. The profit function for the container shipping company is 
not related with the offline retail price in this scenario. 
m rw c                                                                                                               (3.26) 
 
4. Summary 
After discussing the three different scenarios in this section, the functions of 
profit for the container shipping company are derived in correspondent intervals. Then 
where the maximum profit of the container shipping company is in the whole interval 
has to be discussed. 
The function of profit for the container shipping company is continuous in the 
first and second scenarios. In the first scenario, the profit of the container shipping 
company π  is an incremental function of online direct price p  (equation 3.18). In 
the second scenario, the profit of container shipping company π  is a Convex function 
of online direct price p  (equation 3.21). In the third scenario, the profit of container 
shipping company π  has no relation with online direct price p . In addition, the 
profit of the container shipping company in the third scenario is lower than the profit 
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of the container shipping company when = (1- )d r d rp p v b b   in the second 
scenario (equation 3.26). In conclusion, the maximum profit of container shipping 
company exists at the ends of or inside the interval in the second scenario: 
(1- ) (1- )r d d r d rp v b p p v b b        .  
By comparing the values of p ∗ , (1- )r dp v b   and (1- )r d rp v b b   , the 
optimal online price for the container shipping company is derived as follows. 
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                                                         (3.27) 
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       ，
，      
                                                         (3.28) 
 
3.5. Nash equilibrium results of online direct and offline retail prices, 
demands and profits 
The Nash equilibrium results mean the stable state that both the container 
shipping company and the NVOCC/freight forwarder cannot gain more benefits if the 
other parties have no change their pricing strategy and actions (Osborne, 2004). In 
order to find Nash equilibrium results of online direct and offline retail prices, it is 
assumed that the container shipping company and the NVOCC/freight forwarder have 
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full information of each other’s strategies, and they adopt the optimal pricing strategy 
for themselves to maximize their own profits based on the full information. Moreover, 
it is a static one-stage game between the container shipping company and the 
NVOCC/freight forwarder because they set the online direct and offline retail price 
separately at the same time. 
It is easy to find that the optimal offline retail price for the NVOCC/freight 
forwarder is a function of the container shipping company’s online direct price, as 
shown in equation 3.10 and 3.15. Similarly, the optimal online direct price for the 
container shipping company is a function of the NVOCC/freight forwarders offline 
retail price, as shown in equation 3.27 and 3.28. Therefore, the intersection points of 
the container shipping company's function of optimal online direct price and the 
NVOCC/freight forwarder’s function of optimal offline retail price are the Nash 
equilibrium results between the container shipping company and the NVOCC/freight 
forwarder. The Nash equilibrium results are a strategy combination consisting of the 
respective best strategy of the container shipping company and the NVOCC/freight 
forwarder. 
Similar to chapter 3.4, two scenarios are studied here. The first scenario is 
cargo owners only exist on the offline retail channel. The second scenario is cargo 
owners exist on both online direct and offline retail channels. 
 
3.5.1. Scenario 1: cargo owners only exist on offline retail channel 
Cargo owners will give up the online direct channel when they cannot obtain 
positive online consumer utility ( 0d d du v b p    ). In this situation, there is no 
need to analyze the optimal online direct price because the demand for the online direct 
channel is zero. Therefore, only the NVOCC/freight forwarder has to calculate the 
optimal offline retail price. In this scenario, the NVOCC/freight forwarder’s optimal 
selling price and demand for offline retail channel, denoted as offrp  and 
off
rQ , are listed 
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                                                                                 (3.30) 
After applying the demand functions (equation 3.30) into the profit functions 
(equation 3.3 and 3.4), the profit functions for the NVOCC/freight forwarder and the 
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                                                                       (3.30) 
 
3.5.2. Scenario 2: cargo owners do not only exist on offline retail channel 
In the scenario that cargo owners not only exist on the offline retail channel, in 
chapter 3.4.1, the equations of optimal offline retail price for the NVOCC/freight 
forwarder differ under different conditions (equation 3.15), so do the equations of 
optimal online direct price for the container shipping company (equation 3.24). After 
combining the constrains of optimal offline and online direct prices, the Nash 
equilibrium results are finally discussed under the following six constrains. 
 
1. Constrains: 1 +2)(d drw v b vw bb      , 0d r d rv v b b c c      
 
When 1 +2)(d drw v b vw bb       and 0d r d rv v b b c c      are 
satisfied, the optimal offline retail price for NVOCC/freight forwarder p ∗ is derioved 
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as equation 3.29. The optimal online direct price for the container shipping company 
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                                                          (3.28) 
 
After finding the intersections of equation 3.28 and 3.29, the Nash equilibrium 
results of online direct and offline retail price are derived as follows. 
 
(1) When  )( 3
2
1d r d rb b c c v v w      is satisfied, the Nash equilibrium of 
online direct price p  and offline retail price p  are presented as equation 3.30 and 
3.31 respectively. 
  = (2 2 2 11 )
3
N
d dd r rw b b c vp c                                                                        (3.30) 
 1 )
3
= (1d r d r
N
r w b b c c vp                                                    (3.31) 
 
(2) When  )( 3
2
1d r d rb b c c v v w      is satisfied, p  and p  are expressed as 
equation 3.32 and 3.33 respectively.  











2. Constrains: 1 +2)(d drw v b vw bb       , 0d r d rv v b b c c      
 
When 1 +2)(d drw v b vw bb       and 0d r d rv v b b c c      are 
satisfied, the optimal offline retail price for the NVOCC/freight forwarder p ∗  is 
derived as same as equation 3.29. The optimal online direct price for the container 
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               (3.27)                           
 
After finding the intersections of equation 3.29 and 3.27, the Nash equilibrium 
results of online direct and offline retail price are derived as follows. 
 
(1) When  )( 3
2
1d r d rb b c c v v w      is satisfied, p  and p  are 
derived as same as equation 3.30 and 3.31. 
 = (2 2 2 11 )
3
N
d dd r rw b b c vp c                                                    (3.30) 
 1 )
3
= (1d r d r
N




(2) When  )( 3
2
1d r d rb b c c v v w      is satisfied, p  and p  are 
derived as same as equation 3.32 and 3.33 





v w                                                                 (3.33) 
 
3. Constrains: 1 2)( + d drw v bw b v b       , 0d r d rv v b b c c      
 
When 1 2)( + d drw v bw b v b       and 0d r d rv v b b c c     are 
satisfied, the optimal offline retail price for the NVOCC/freight forwarder p ∗  is 
derived as equation 3.34. The optimal online direct price for the container shipping 
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                 (3.28) 
After finding the intersections of equation 3.34 and 3.28, the Nash equilibrium 
results of online direct and offline retail price are derived as equation 3.35 and 3.36 
respectively. 
  =wNdp                                              (3.35)    
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 = 1 rNr dv b bp w                                               (3.36) 
 
4. Constrains: 1 2)( + d drw v bw b v b      , 0d r d rv v b b c c      
 
When 1 2)( + d drw v bw b v b       and 0d r d rv v b b c c     are 
satisfied, the optimal offline retail price for the NVOCC/freight forwarder p ∗  is 
derived as same as equation 3.34. The optimal online direct price for the container 
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     (3.27)  
After finding the intersections of equation 3.34 and 3.27, the Nash equilibrium 
results of online direct and offline retail price are derived as same as equation 3.35 and 
3.36 respectively. 
=wNdp          (3.35)
  = 1 rNr dv b bp w           (3.36) 
                             
5. Constrains: +)(1 2 dr dw v wb b v b      , 0d r d rv v b b c c      
 
When +)(1 2 dr dw v wb b v b      and 0d r d rv v b b c c      are 
satisfied, the optimal offline retail price for the NVOCC/freight forwarder p ∗  is 
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derived as same as equation 3.34. The optimal online direct price for the container 
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After finding the intersections of equation 3.34 and 3.28, the Nash equilibrium 
results of online direct and offline retail price are derived as same as equation 3.35 and 
3.36 respectively. 
=wNdp          (3.35)
 = 1 rNr dv b bp w              (3.36
                                           
6. Constrains: +)(1 2 dr dw v wb b v b      , 0d r d rv v b b c c      
 
When +)(1 2 dr dw v wb b v b      are 0d r d rv v b b c c      
satisfied, the optimal offline retail price for the NVOCC/freight forwarder p ∗  is 
derived as same as equation 3.34. The optimal online direct price for the container 
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        (3.28) 
After finding the intersections of equation 3.34 and 3.28, the Nash equilibrium 
results of online direct and offline retail price are derived as same as equation 3.35 and 
3.36 respectively. 
=wNdp          (3.35)                                  
 = 1 rNr dv b bp w          (3.36)                            
                        
Summary 
Based on the above analysis under six different conditions, the Nash equilibrium 
is the results of prices, demands and profits in scenario 2 and are concluded as follows: 
(1) When (1 + 2) rdb bv   and  )( 3
2
1d r d rb b c c v v w      are satisfied, 
the p  and p  are derived as equation 3.30 and 3.31 respectively. 
 = (2 2 2 11 )
3
N
d dd r rw b b c vp c                   (3.30)                                   
 1 )
3
= (1d r d r
N
r w b b c c vp                          (3.31)      
                                    
After applying the equation 3.30 and 3.31 into equation 3.11 and 3.19, the Nash 
equilibrium results of demand for offline retail channel NrQ and Nash equilibrium 
results of demand for online direct channel NdQ  are presented as equation 3.37 and 
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     (3.38)                                  
Moreover, after applying the equation 3.30, 3.31, 3.37 and 3.38 into equation 3.3 
and 3.4, the Nash equilibrium results of profit for the NVOCC/freight forwarder   π  
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(2) When (1 + 2) rdb bv   and  )( 3
2
1d r d rb b c c v v w      are satisfied, 
p  and p  are derived as equation 3.32 and 3.33 respectively. 





v w                    (3.33)                                  
After applying the equation 3.32 and 3.33 into equation 3.11 and 3.19, NrQ and 
N
dQ  are presented as equation 3.41 and 3.42 respectively. In this situation, cargo 
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Moreover, after applying the equation 3.32, 3.33, 3.41 and 3.42 into equation 3.3 
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(3) When (1 + 2) rdb bv   is satisfied，p  and p  are derived as equation 
3.35 and 3.36 respectively. In this situation, cargo owners exist on both online direct 
and offline retail channels. 
=Ndp w         (3.35)                                   
 = 1 rNr dv b bp w                                (3.36)                                                
After applying the equation 3.35 and 3.36 into equation 3.11 and 3.19, NrQ and 
N
dQ  are presented as equation 3.45 and 3.46 respectively. This is the situation that the 
cargo owner only exists on online direct channel. 
1NrQ          (3.45)                                               
0NdQ         (3.46)                                               
Moreover, after applying the equation 3.35, 3.36, 3.45 and 3.46 into equation 3.3 
and 3.4, the π  and π  are presented as equation 3.47 and 3.48 respectively.  
 1Nr d rv b b          (3.47)                                                
rm
N w c         (3.48) 
 
3.6. Summary 
In chapter 3, a conceptual dual-channel supply chain in CSI is established as the 
first research objective. Then seven influencing factors are selected as the independent 
variables and inputs of the models of profits for the container shipping company and 
the NVOCC/freight forwarder. Meanwhile, the consumer utility theory and Nash 
equilibrium theory are applied to construct the models and derive the Nash equilibrium 
results of prices, demands and profits for the container shipping company and the 
NVOCC/freight forwarder. The Nash equilibrium results of online direct price are 
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exactly the pricing strategy proposed for the container shipping company. Moreover, 
the numerical examples in next chapter are conducted based on the derived Nash 









Chapter 4 : NUMERICAL EXAMPLES, FINDINGS 
AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Based on the results of chapter 3, numerical examples of models are conducted 
in this chapter to verify the impacts of changes of specific independent variables on 
the Nash equilibrium results: demand, optimal prices and profits for the container 
shipping company and the NVOCC/freight forwarder. Moreover, the findings of 
numerical examples and correspondent implications for the container shipping 
company are discussed in depth. This chapter is organized as the following three 
sections.  
In the first section, explanations of variables assignment are made. Variables 
assignment is the first step of numerical examples. In order to make the dissertation 
more valuable and useful for the decision-making of container shipping companies, 
the independent variables are assigned with reference to real market data from the CSI. 
In the second section, the effects of changing online unit cost c  and consumer 
preference for online direct channel θ on pricing strategy and profits are analysed with 
specific variables assignment. After that, the findings and implications are concluded 
for the numerical examples. Similarly, in the third section, the effects of changing 
offline unit cost c , wholesale price w and valuaction v are put forwarded; pricing 
strategy and profits are discussed with specific variables assignment. The findings and 
implications are also summarized correspondingly. 
 
4.1 Explanations of variables assignment 
Combined with the explanations of the independent variables in chapter 3, the 
meaning and assignment of independent variables in a specific container liner service 
are discussed here. Furthermore, an international container shipping company 
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operating both main trucking routes and continental trade lines provides the related 
data of the route from the Far East to North Europe. 
(1) v represents consumers’ ideal assumption of the utility of unit container 
shipping service, and it is simplified as the sum of the average long-term freight and 
assumed online consumers purchase cost in a specific route. 
(2) 	w  means the average wholesale price offered by the container shipping 
company to the NVOCC/freight forwarder. The margin between w and v is small in 
CSI because of the more transparent market and more severe competition. Normally, 
the NVOCC/freight forwarder expects to earn more through the other shipping 
supporting activities. 
(3) θ represents the cargo owners’ preference for online direct channel, and is 
assumed to change from zero to one (θ ∈ 0, 1 ). 
(4) c  represents the estimated average unit slot cost calculated by the container 
shipping company. In CSI, the unit slot cost c  is close to the wholesale price w 
because of the overcapacity and intense competition. What is more, the gap between 
c  and w will be shortened by low slot utility of containerships. Sometimes c  is even 
greater than w in some specific routes for international container shipping companies, 
who want to provide world network service to cargo owners even if losing money on 
that route. 
(5) c  is assumed to change in a specific interval which contains the following 
situations. 
a. When assuming online unit cost is greater than offline unit cost (c c ), the 
container shipping company acts as the pioneer in the emerging stage of e-commerce 
in CSI. The beginning IT and technology investment lead to high online unit cost c . 
In this situation, the margin between c  and c  is relatively large. The margin between 
c  and c  depends on how much the container shipping company invest in the opening 
selling channel. 
b. When assuming that online unit cost equals offline unit cost (c c ), the e-
commerce in the container liner industry enters into the growing stage. More container 
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shipping companies and cargo owners can join the online direct channel in this 
situation. 
c. When assuming that online unit cost is lower than offline unit cost (c c ), 
e-commerce in the container liner industry is in the mature stage. In this situation, the 
margin between online unit cost and offline unit cost depends on the extent of 
competition in a specific route. The more intense the competition, the more rebate the 
container shipping company pays to the NVOCC/freight forwarder on the offline retail 
channel. The rebate can be saved on the online direct channel because the container 
shipping company can approach to cargo owner directly. Therefore, the more intense 
the competition, the higher margin between online and offline unit costs. 
(6) b  and b  are consumer offline and online purchase costs. There are no 
related articles addressing consumer purchase costs in CSI, and related data from cargo 
owners cannot be obtained. Therefore, b  and b  can only be assigned with an 
estimated value. It can be assumed that online purchase cost is lower than offline 
purchase cost b b . The first reason is that searching costs for container shipping 
services and negotiating costs can be saved for cargo owners because of the price 
transparency on the online direct channel. The second reason is that implementation 
cost can be saved because cargo owners can approach container shipping companies 
directly. In addition, the margin between b  and b  is relatively small because the 
characteristics of the service supply chain as discussed in chapter 3. 
Based on the explanations of independent variables, numerical examples are 
conducted with specific assignment in the following sections.  
 
4.2. The effects of online unit cost and consumer preference for online direct 
channel on pricing strategy and profits 
In this part, the effects of online unit cost c  and consumer preference for online 
direct channel θ on pricing strategy and profits are examined firstly through numerical 
examples. Then the corresponding findings and implications for container shipping 
company are also concluded and put forward.  
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4.2.1. Numerical examples 
With reference to the data provided by an international container shipping 
company, online unit cost c  and consumer preference for online direct channel θ are 
assigned with a specific interval and other independent variables are assigned with 
specific values as follows: 
v 1560, b 100, b 50, c 1200,	w 1400  
According to the results of Nash equilibrium, the cargo owners exist in both 
online and offline channels when dw v b   is satisfied. After calculating with the 
specific values, the cargo owners exist on both online and offline channels only when 
0.968   is satisfied.  
1. θ ∈ 0, 0.962  
The cargo owners only purchase the shipping service through the offline retail 
channel in this situation. The Nash equilibrium of prices and profits are not affected 
by θ and c  where θ ∈ 0, 0.962  according to equation 3.18. The Nash equilibrium 
results can be calculated as follows through equation 3.29 and 3.30. 
1460offrp   1
off
rQ   60r  200m   
2.	θ ∈ 0.962, 1  
In this situation, the Nash equilibrium of prices and profits will be affected by θ 
and c  according to equation 3.39, 3.40, 3.43 and 3.44. The Matlab R2016a is applied 
to do the numerical examples with the following assignment: c 	 ∈ 1000, 1400  and 
θ ∈ 0.962, 1 . Howerver, there are some invalid values which do not comply with 
the assumptions in Nash equilibrium results. The online demand Q  is less than zero 
and offline demand Q  is greater than one when  c 	 ∈ 1270, 1400  and θ ∈
0.962, 0.968 . Therefore, the interval of c 	 and θ are adjusted as follows to remove 
those invalid values. The programming contents of Matlab for the numerical examples 
here are listed in appendix A. 
 c 	 ∈ 1000, 1270   
 θ ∈ 0.968, 1 . 
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 (1) The effects of  and θ on  and  
The Nash equilibrium results of demand for online direct channel Q are 
presented in Table 3. Figure 15 shows the effects of c  and θ on Q .  
a. When c  increases in the interval: c ∈ 1000, 1200 , Q  is a constant 
(Q 0.2) with c  and θ.  
b. When c  increases in the next interval: c ∈ 1200, 1270 , Q  is inversely 
corrected with c , while positivle corrected with θ. Q  finally falls from 0.2 to 0 
where c 1270 and θ 0.968.  
c. Q  will reduce to zero When c  increase to c 1275 and θ 0.968.  
 
Figure 15. Effects of c  and θ on Q  
 
Table 3. Q  under various combinations of c  and θ 
 
Q  changes in the reverse way because of the conditon Q Q 1. The Nash 
equilibrium results of demand for online direct channel Q are presented in Table 4. 
Figure 16 shows the effects of c  and θ on Q .  
θ         Cd 1000 1014.211 1028.421 1042.632 1056.842 1071.053 1085.263 1099.474 1113.684 1127.895 1142.105 1156.316 1170.526 1184.737 1198.947 1213.158 1227.368 1241.579 1255.789 1270
0.968 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.14 0.10 0.05 0.00
0.969684 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.06 0.01
0.971368 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.16 0.11 0.07 0.02
0.973053 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.12 0.07 0.03
0.974737 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.13 0.08 0.04
0.976421 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.14 0.09 0.04
0.978105 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.15 0.10 0.05
0.979789 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.16 0.11 0.06
0.981474 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.12 0.07
0.983158 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.13 0.08
0.984842 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.14 0.09
0.986526 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.14 0.10
0.988211 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.11
0.989895 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.16 0.11
0.991579 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.12
0.993263 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.13
0.994947 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.14
0.996632 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.15
0.998316 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.16
1 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.17
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a. When c  increases in the interval: c ∈ 1000, 1200 , Q  is a constant 
(Q 0.8) with c  and θ.   
b. When c  increases in the next interval: c ∈ 1200, 1270 , Q  is positively 
corrected with c , while Q  is inversely corrected with θ. Q  finally increases from 
0.8 to 1 where c  =1270 and θ 0.968. 
 
 
Figure 16. Effects of c  and θ on Q  
 
Table 4. Q  under various combinations of c  and θ 
 
 
The comparative findings of Q  and  Q  can be concluded as Table 5. c  and 
θ do not affect the Nash equilibrium results of demand for online direct and offline 
retail channels when c ∈ 1000, 1200). Q  decreases to zero and Q  increases to 
one when c  rises from 1200 to 1270. 
θ         Cd 1000 1014.211 1028.421 1042.632 1056.842 1071.053 1085.263 1099.474 1113.684 1127.895 1142.105 1156.316 1170.526 1184.737 1198.947 1213.158 1227.368 1241.579 1255.789 1270
0.968 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.86 0.90 0.95 1.00
0.969684 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.94 0.99
0.971368 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.84 0.89 0.93 0.98
0.973053 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.83 0.88 0.93 0.97
0.974737 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.82 0.87 0.92 0.96
0.976421 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.86 0.91 0.96
0.978105 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.85 0.90 0.95
0.979789 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.84 0.89 0.94
0.981474 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.83 0.88 0.93
0.983158 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.83 0.87 0.92
0.984842 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.82 0.86 0.91
0.986526 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.86 0.90
0.988211 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.85 0.89
0.989895 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.84 0.89
0.991579 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.83 0.88
0.993263 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.82 0.87
0.994947 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.86
0.996632 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.85
0.998316 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.84
1 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.83
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Table 5. Effects of c  and θ on Q  and Q  
 c ∈ 1000, 1200) 
θ ∈ 0.968, 1  
c ∈ 1200, 1270) 
θ ∈ 0.968, 1  
Q  Q  and c  Constant Q  and c  - 
Q  and θ Constant Q  and θ + 
Q  Q  and c  Constant Q  and c  + 
Q  and θ Constant Q  and θ - 
 
(2) The effects of  and θ on  and  
The Nash equilibrium results of the online direct price for the container shipping 
company Q are presented in Table 6. Figure 17 shows the effects of c  and θ on p .  
a. When c  increases in the interval: c ∈ 1000, 1200 , p  is a constant with 
c  and positively corrected with θ. p  increases from 1430 to 1480 when θ increases 
from 0.968 to 1. 
b. When c  increases in the next interval: c ∈ 1200, 1270 , p  increases 
with c  and θ. p  finally increases to 1486 where  c 1270 and θ 1.   
 
 





Table 6.	p 	under various combinations of c  and θ 
 
 
The Nash equilibrium results of profits of offline retail price for NVOCC/freight 
forwarder p  are presented in Table 7. Figure 18 shows the effects of c  and θ on p .  
a. When c  increases in the interval: c ∈ 1000, 1200 , p  is a constant with 
c  and θ (p 1480). 
b. When c  increases in the next interval: c ∈ 1200, 1270 , p  increases with c  










θ         Cd 1000 1014.211 1028.421 1042.632 1056.842 1071.053 1085.263 1099.474 1113.684 1127.895 1142.105 1156.316 1170.526 1184.737 1198.947 1213.158 1227.368 1241.579 1255.789 1270
0.968 1430.08 1430.08 1430.08 1430.08 1430.08 1430.08 1430.08 1430.08 1430.08 1430.08 1430.08 1430.08 1430.08 1430.08 1430.08 1432.13 1441.61 1451.08 1460.55 1470.03
0.969684 1432.71 1432.71 1432.71 1432.71 1432.71 1432.71 1432.71 1432.71 1432.71 1432.71 1432.71 1432.71 1432.71 1432.71 1432.71 1433.01 1442.48 1451.96 1461.43 1470.90
0.971368 1435.33 1435.33 1435.33 1435.33 1435.33 1435.33 1435.33 1435.33 1435.33 1435.33 1435.33 1435.33 1435.33 1435.33 1435.33 1435.33 1443.36 1452.83 1462.30 1471.78
0.973053 1437.96 1437.96 1437.96 1437.96 1437.96 1437.96 1437.96 1437.96 1437.96 1437.96 1437.96 1437.96 1437.96 1437.96 1437.96 1437.96 1444.23 1453.71 1463.18 1472.65
0.974737 1440.59 1440.59 1440.59 1440.59 1440.59 1440.59 1440.59 1440.59 1440.59 1440.59 1440.59 1440.59 1440.59 1440.59 1440.59 1440.59 1445.11 1454.58 1464.06 1473.53
0.976421 1443.22 1443.22 1443.22 1443.22 1443.22 1443.22 1443.22 1443.22 1443.22 1443.22 1443.22 1443.22 1443.22 1443.22 1443.22 1443.22 1445.98 1455.46 1464.93 1474.41
0.978105 1445.84 1445.84 1445.84 1445.84 1445.84 1445.84 1445.84 1445.84 1445.84 1445.84 1445.84 1445.84 1445.84 1445.84 1445.84 1445.84 1446.86 1456.33 1465.81 1475.28
0.979789 1448.47 1448.47 1448.47 1448.47 1448.47 1448.47 1448.47 1448.47 1448.47 1448.47 1448.47 1448.47 1448.47 1448.47 1448.47 1448.47 1448.47 1457.21 1466.68 1476.16
0.981474 1451.10 1451.10 1451.10 1451.10 1451.10 1451.10 1451.10 1451.10 1451.10 1451.10 1451.10 1451.10 1451.10 1451.10 1451.10 1451.10 1451.10 1458.09 1467.56 1477.03
0.983158 1453.73 1453.73 1453.73 1453.73 1453.73 1453.73 1453.73 1453.73 1453.73 1453.73 1453.73 1453.73 1453.73 1453.73 1453.73 1453.73 1453.73 1458.96 1468.44 1477.91
0.984842 1456.35 1456.35 1456.35 1456.35 1456.35 1456.35 1456.35 1456.35 1456.35 1456.35 1456.35 1456.35 1456.35 1456.35 1456.35 1456.35 1456.35 1459.84 1469.31 1478.78
0.986526 1458.98 1458.98 1458.98 1458.98 1458.98 1458.98 1458.98 1458.98 1458.98 1458.98 1458.98 1458.98 1458.98 1458.98 1458.98 1458.98 1458.98 1460.71 1470.19 1479.66
0.988211 1461.61 1461.61 1461.61 1461.61 1461.61 1461.61 1461.61 1461.61 1461.61 1461.61 1461.61 1461.61 1461.61 1461.61 1461.61 1461.61 1461.61 1461.61 1471.06 1480.54
0.989895 1464.24 1464.24 1464.24 1464.24 1464.24 1464.24 1464.24 1464.24 1464.24 1464.24 1464.24 1464.24 1464.24 1464.24 1464.24 1464.24 1464.24 1464.24 1471.94 1481.41
0.991579 1466.86 1466.86 1466.86 1466.86 1466.86 1466.86 1466.86 1466.86 1466.86 1466.86 1466.86 1466.86 1466.86 1466.86 1466.86 1466.86 1466.86 1466.86 1472.81 1482.29
0.993263 1469.49 1469.49 1469.49 1469.49 1469.49 1469.49 1469.49 1469.49 1469.49 1469.49 1469.49 1469.49 1469.49 1469.49 1469.49 1469.49 1469.49 1469.49 1473.69 1483.16
0.994947 1472.12 1472.12 1472.12 1472.12 1472.12 1472.12 1472.12 1472.12 1472.12 1472.12 1472.12 1472.12 1472.12 1472.12 1472.12 1472.12 1472.12 1472.12 1474.57 1484.04
0.996632 1474.75 1474.75 1474.75 1474.75 1474.75 1474.75 1474.75 1474.75 1474.75 1474.75 1474.75 1474.75 1474.75 1474.75 1474.75 1474.75 1474.75 1474.75 1475.44 1484.92
0.998316 1477.37 1477.37 1477.37 1477.37 1477.37 1477.37 1477.37 1477.37 1477.37 1477.37 1477.37 1477.37 1477.37 1477.37 1477.37 1477.37 1477.37 1477.37 1477.37 1485.79
1 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1486.67
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Table 7. p 	under various combinations of c  and θ 
 
 
The comparative findings of p  and p  can be concluded as Table 8. For 
container shipping company, p  is positively correlated with θ but not affected by c  
when c ∈ 1000, 1200). p 	is positively correlated with both c  and θ when c ∈
1200, 1270). For NVOCC/freight forwardor, p  is not affected by both c  and θ 
when c ∈ 1000, 1200).	p  is positively correlated with c  but inversely correlated 
with θ when c ∈ 1200, 1270). 
 
Table 8. Effects of c  and θ on p  and p  
 c ∈ 1000, 1200) 
θ ∈ 0.968, 1  
c ∈ 1200, 1270) 
θ ∈ 0.968, 1  
p  p  and c  Constant p  and c  + 
p  and θ + p  and θ + 
p  p and c  Constant p and c  + 
p  and θ Constant p  and θ - 
 
(3) The effects of  and θ on ,  and   
The Nash equilibrium results of profit for container shipping company π  are 
presented in Table 9. Figure 19 shows the effects of c  and θ on π  .  
π  is inversely correlated with c  but positively correlated with θ when c ∈
1000, 1270 . The maximum π  is 256 where c 1000  and θ 1 . The 
minimum π  is 200 where c 1270 and θ 0.968. 
θ         Cd 1000 1014.211 1028.421 1042.632 1056.842 1071.053 1085.263 1099.474 1113.684 1127.895 1142.105 1156.316 1170.526 1184.737 1198.947 1213.158 1227.368 1241.579 1255.789 1270
0.968 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1481.03 1485.76 1490.50 1495.24 1499.97
0.969684 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.15 1484.89 1489.62 1494.36 1499.10
0.971368 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1484.01 1488.75 1493.48 1498.22
0.973053 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1483.14 1487.87 1492.61 1497.35
0.974737 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1482.26 1487.00 1491.73 1496.47
0.976421 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1481.38 1486.12 1490.86 1495.59
0.978105 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.51 1485.24 1489.98 1494.72
0.979789 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1484.37 1489.11 1493.84
0.981474 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1483.49 1488.23 1492.97
0.983158 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1482.62 1487.35 1492.09
0.984842 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1481.74 1486.48 1491.22
0.986526 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.87 1485.60 1490.34
0.988211 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1484.73 1489.46
0.989895 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1483.85 1488.59
0.991579 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1482.98 1487.71
0.993263 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1482.10 1486.84
0.994947 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1481.22 1485.96
0.996632 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.35 1485.08
0.998316 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1480.00 1484.21




Figure 19. Effects of c  and θ on  π  
 
Table 9. π  under various combinations of c  and θ 
 
 
The Nash equilibrium results of profit for the NVOCC/freight forwarder π  are 
presented in Table 10. Figure 20 shows the effects of c  and θ on π  .  
a. When c  increases in the interval: c ∈ 1000, 1200 , π  is a constant with 
c  and θ (π 64). 
b. When c  increases in the next interval: c ∈ 1200, 1270 , π  is positively 
correlated with c , but inversely corrected with θ. π  finally rises from 64 to 150 
where c 1270 and θ 0.968.  
 
θ         Cd 1000 1014.211 1028.421 1042.632 1056.842 1071.053 1085.263 1099.474 1113.684 1127.895 1142.105 1156.316 1170.526 1184.737 1198.947 1213.158 1227.368 1241.579 1255.789 1270
0.968 246.02 243.17 240.33 237.49 234.65 231.81 228.96 226.12 223.28 220.44 217.59 214.75 211.91 209.07 206.23 203.60 202.03 200.90 200.23 200.00
0.969684 246.54 243.70 240.86 238.02 235.17 232.33 229.49 226.65 223.80 220.96 218.12 215.28 212.44 209.59 206.75 203.94 202.28 201.08 200.32 200.01
0.971368 247.07 244.22 241.38 238.54 235.70 232.86 230.01 227.17 224.33 221.49 218.65 215.80 212.96 210.12 207.28 204.44 202.56 201.27 200.42 200.03
0.973053 247.59 244.75 241.91 239.07 236.22 233.38 230.54 227.70 224.86 222.01 219.17 216.33 213.49 210.65 207.80 204.96 202.84 201.47 200.55 200.07
0.974737 248.12 245.28 242.43 239.59 236.75 233.91 231.07 228.22 225.38 222.54 219.70 216.85 214.01 211.17 208.33 205.49 203.15 201.69 200.68 200.12
0.976421 248.64 245.80 242.96 240.12 237.27 234.43 231.59 228.75 225.91 223.06 220.22 217.38 214.54 211.70 208.85 206.01 203.47 201.93 200.84 200.19
0.978105 249.17 246.33 243.48 240.64 237.80 234.96 232.12 229.27 226.43 223.59 220.75 217.91 215.06 212.22 209.38 206.54 203.80 202.18 201.00 200.28
0.979789 249.69 246.85 244.01 241.17 238.33 235.48 232.64 229.80 226.96 224.12 221.27 218.43 215.59 212.75 209.90 207.06 204.22 202.44 201.19 200.38
0.981474 250.22 247.38 244.54 241.69 238.85 236.01 233.17 230.33 227.48 224.64 221.80 218.96 216.11 213.27 210.43 207.59 204.75 202.72 201.39 200.49
0.983158 250.75 247.90 245.06 242.22 239.38 236.53 233.69 230.85 228.01 225.17 222.32 219.48 216.64 213.80 210.96 208.11 205.27 203.02 201.60 200.63
0.984842 251.27 248.43 245.59 242.74 239.90 237.06 234.22 231.38 228.53 225.69 222.85 220.01 217.17 214.32 211.48 208.64 205.80 203.33 201.83 200.77
0.986526 251.80 248.95 246.11 243.27 240.43 237.59 234.74 231.90 229.06 226.22 223.38 220.53 217.69 214.85 212.01 209.16 206.32 203.66 202.07 200.93
0.988211 252.32 249.48 246.64 243.80 240.95 238.11 235.27 232.43 229.58 226.74 223.90 221.06 218.22 215.37 212.53 209.69 206.85 204.01 202.33 201.11
0.989895 252.85 250.01 247.16 244.32 241.48 238.64 235.79 232.95 230.11 227.27 224.43 221.58 218.74 215.90 213.06 210.22 207.37 204.53 202.61 201.30
0.991579 253.37 250.53 247.69 244.85 242.00 239.16 236.32 233.48 230.64 227.79 224.95 222.11 219.27 216.43 213.58 210.74 207.90 205.06 202.90 201.51
0.993263 253.90 251.06 248.21 245.37 242.53 239.69 236.85 234.00 231.16 228.32 225.48 222.63 219.79 216.95 214.11 211.27 208.42 205.58 203.20 201.73
0.994947 254.42 251.58 248.74 245.90 243.06 240.21 237.37 234.53 231.69 228.84 226.00 223.16 220.32 217.48 214.63 211.79 208.95 206.11 203.53 201.97
0.996632 254.95 252.11 249.26 246.42 243.58 240.74 237.90 235.05 232.21 229.37 226.53 223.69 220.84 218.00 215.16 212.32 209.48 206.63 203.86 202.22
0.998316 255.47 252.63 249.79 246.95 244.11 241.26 238.42 235.58 232.74 229.90 227.05 224.21 221.37 218.53 215.69 212.84 210.00 207.16 204.32 202.49
1 256.00 253.16 250.32 247.47 244.63 241.79 238.95 236.11 233.26 230.42 227.58 224.74 221.89 219.05 216.21 213.37 210.53 207.68 204.84 202.78
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Figure 20. Effects of c  and θ on π  
 
Table 10. π  under various combinations of c  and θ 
 
 
The Nash equilibrium results of profit for the whole supply chain π  are 
presented in Table 11. Figure 21 shows the effects of c  and θ on π  .  
a. When c  increases in the interval: c ∈ 1000, 1200 ,  π 	is positively 
correlated with θ, but inversely corrected with c . Maximum π  stands at 320 where 
c 1000  and θ 1 . Minimum π  stands at 270 where c 1200  and θ
0.968. 
b. When c  increases in the next interval: c ∈ 1200, 1270 , π  are positively 
correlated with c . However, the relation between π  and θ is not stable. In the 
beginning, π  is inversely corrected with θ when θ is low, but positively correlated 
with θ  when θ  is high. The positive relation becomes weak and weak when c  
increases. Finally, the relation between π  and θ becomes fully negative when c  
θ         Cd 1000 1014.211 1028.421 1042.632 1056.842 1071.053 1085.263 1099.474 1113.684 1127.895 1142.105 1156.316 1170.526 1184.737 1198.947 1213.158 1227.368 1241.579 1255.789 1270
0.968 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 98.48 110.33 122.85 136.05 149.92
0.969684 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 96.36 108.09 120.49 133.56 147.30
0.971368 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 105.87 118.14 131.09 144.71
0.973053 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 103.67 115.82 128.65 142.14
0.974737 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 101.50 113.53 126.23 139.60
0.976421 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 99.35 111.25 123.83 137.07
0.978105 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 97.22 109.00 121.45 134.57
0.979789 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 106.77 119.10 132.10
0.981474 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 104.57 116.77 129.64
0.983158 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 102.38 114.46 127.21
0.984842 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 100.23 112.18 124.80
0.986526 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 98.09 109.92 122.42
0.988211 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 107.68 120.06
0.989895 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 105.47 117.72
0.991579 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 103.27 115.40
0.993263 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 101.11 113.11
0.994947 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 98.96 110.84
0.996632 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 96.84 108.59
0.998316 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 106.37
1 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 64.00 104.17
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increases to 1270. π  rises from 270 where c 1200 and θ 0.968 to 350 where 
c 120 and θ 0.968. 
 
 
Figure 21. Effects of c  and θ on π  
 
Table 11. π  under various combinations of c  and θ 
 
 
The comparative findings of π , π  and π  can be concluded as Table 12. 
θ  is positively correlated with the profit of the container shipping company but 
inversely correlated with the profit of the NVOCC/freight forwarder. The relation 
between θ  and π  is changing when c  changes. The original positive relation 
finally changes into positive relation. c  is inversely correlated with the profits of the 
container shipping company and the whole supply chain. c  have no affect to the profit 
of the NVOCC/freight forwarder when c ∈ 1000, 1200 ), but c  is positively 
correlated with the profit of the NVOCC/freight forwarder when c ∈ 1200, 1270).  
 
θ         Cd 1000 1014.211 1028.421 1042.632 1056.842 1071.053 1085.263 1099.474 1113.684 1127.895 1142.105 1156.316 1170.526 1184.737 1198.947 1213.158 1227.368 1241.579 1255.789 1270
0.968 310.02 307.17 304.33 301.49 298.65 295.81 292.96 290.12 287.28 284.44 281.59 278.75 275.91 273.07 270.23 302.08 312.36 323.76 336.28 349.92
0.969684 310.54 307.70 304.86 302.02 299.17 296.33 293.49 290.65 287.80 284.96 282.12 279.28 276.44 273.59 270.75 300.30 310.37 321.56 333.88 347.31
0.971368 311.07 308.22 305.38 302.54 299.70 296.86 294.01 291.17 288.33 285.49 282.65 279.80 276.96 274.12 271.28 268.44 308.42 319.41 331.52 344.74
0.973053 311.59 308.75 305.91 303.07 300.22 297.38 294.54 291.70 288.86 286.01 283.17 280.33 277.49 274.65 271.80 268.96 306.52 317.29 329.19 342.21
0.974737 312.12 309.28 306.43 303.59 300.75 297.91 295.07 292.22 289.38 286.54 283.70 280.85 278.01 275.17 272.33 269.49 304.65 315.22 326.91 339.72
0.976421 312.64 309.80 306.96 304.12 301.27 298.43 295.59 292.75 289.91 287.06 284.22 281.38 278.54 275.70 272.85 270.01 302.82 313.18 324.66 337.27
0.978105 313.17 310.33 307.48 304.64 301.80 298.96 296.12 293.27 290.43 287.59 284.75 281.91 279.06 276.22 273.38 270.54 301.02 311.18 322.45 334.85
0.979789 313.69 310.85 308.01 305.17 302.33 299.48 296.64 293.80 290.96 288.12 285.27 282.43 279.59 276.75 273.90 271.06 268.22 309.22 320.28 332.48
0.981474 314.22 311.38 308.54 305.69 302.85 300.01 297.17 294.33 291.48 288.64 285.80 282.96 280.11 277.27 274.43 271.59 268.75 307.29 318.15 330.14
0.983158 314.75 311.90 309.06 306.22 303.38 300.53 297.69 294.85 292.01 289.17 286.32 283.48 280.64 277.80 274.96 272.11 269.27 305.41 316.06 327.84
0.984842 315.27 312.43 309.59 306.74 303.90 301.06 298.22 295.38 292.53 289.69 286.85 284.01 281.17 278.32 275.48 272.64 269.80 303.56 314.01 325.58
0.986526 315.80 312.95 310.11 307.27 304.43 301.59 298.74 295.90 293.06 290.22 287.38 284.53 281.69 278.85 276.01 273.16 270.32 301.75 311.99 323.35
0.988211 316.32 313.48 310.64 307.80 304.95 302.11 299.27 296.43 293.58 290.74 287.90 285.06 282.22 279.37 276.53 273.69 270.85 268.01 310.01 321.17
0.989895 316.85 314.01 311.16 308.32 305.48 302.64 299.79 296.95 294.11 291.27 288.43 285.58 282.74 279.90 277.06 274.22 271.37 268.53 308.07 319.02
0.991579 317.37 314.53 311.69 308.85 306.00 303.16 300.32 297.48 294.64 291.79 288.95 286.11 283.27 280.43 277.58 274.74 271.90 269.06 306.17 316.91
0.993263 317.90 315.06 312.21 309.37 306.53 303.69 300.85 298.00 295.16 292.32 289.48 286.63 283.79 280.95 278.11 275.27 272.42 269.58 304.31 314.84
0.994947 318.42 315.58 312.74 309.90 307.06 304.21 301.37 298.53 295.69 292.84 290.00 287.16 284.32 281.48 278.63 275.79 272.95 270.11 302.49 312.81
0.996632 318.95 316.11 313.26 310.42 307.58 304.74 301.90 299.05 296.21 293.37 290.53 287.69 284.84 282.00 279.16 276.32 273.48 270.63 300.70 310.82
0.998316 319.47 316.63 313.79 310.95 308.11 305.26 302.42 299.58 296.74 293.90 291.05 288.21 285.37 282.53 279.69 276.84 274.00 271.16 268.32 308.86
1 320.00 317.16 314.32 311.47 308.63 305.79 302.95 300.11 297.26 294.42 291.58 288.74 285.89 283.05 280.21 277.37 274.53 271.68 268.84 306.94
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Table 12. Effects of c  and θ on π , π  and π  
 c ∈ 1000, 1200) 
θ ∈ 0.968, 1  
c ∈ 1200, 1270) 
θ ∈ 0.968, 1  
π  p  and c  - 
p  and θ + 
π  π  and c  Constant π  and c  + 
π  and θ Constant π  and θ - 
π  π  and c  - 
π  and θ + 
 
4.2.2. Findings and implications 
After implementing the numerical examples, the following questions are answered 
in this part as the implications for the container shipping company: When is the time 
for the container shipping company to emerge in e-commerce through the analysis of 
consumer preference for the online direct channel? How should the container shipping 
company set the optimal online direct price at different e-commerce evolvement stages 
with changing online unit cost c ? With the development of e-commerce in CSI, the 
online unit cost c  will be reduced. What are the impacts on the container shipping 
company’s profit and optimal online direct price with decreasing online unit cost c ? 
 
1. The online direct channel has not yet been fully developed for container 
shipping company to enter into e-commerce. 
According to the results of Nash equilibrium, the online direct channel will only 
exist when dw v b   is satisfied, which means the timing of opening the online 
direct channel depends on the values of v, θ, w and b . As dicussed in chapter 3, b  
is perceived by cargo owners and controlled by the third party, which will not be 
changed in a short term. Therefore, the Internet entry timing is decided by v, θ and w. 
The smaller margin between v and w, the higher θ is required to open the selling 
channel for the container shipping company. That is exactly the reality in CSI.  
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(1) The current situation of undeveloped online direct channel in CSI 
As the previous calculation shows, it is only meaningful or profitable for the 
container shipping company to open the online direct channel on this route when θ
0.968. However, cargo owners’ preference for the online direct channel is extremely 
low in the current situation. The reasons can be concluded as follows: 
a. Long-term traditional purchasing habit or industry culture 
The industry is known for a stubborn industry which relies on experiences and 
old beliefs. Container shipping is sensitive to the increment changes, especially when 
it becomes vulnerable due to its huge costs and investments. It also takes more time 
than other industries to recover. The cargo owners used to rely on NVOCC/freight 
forwarders for their business due to their long-term cooperative relationship. Cargo 
owners can count on NVOCC/freight forwarders for all shipping supporting logistic 
activities. 
b. The insufficient investment from container shipping company 
Container shipping companies were among the first to implement information 
and communication technology. Shipping companies tend to hesitate to move from 
business transaction to the Internet. EDI and Value-Added Networks required huge 
investment to establish. The change from one technology to another will lead to an 
obsolete of the prior one and the need of enormous financing. On the other hand, EDI 
is as inferior as the Internet in dealing with documentation and transactions. With 
respect to the large contract customers, the reliability and security of EDI may be more 
appropriate than the Internet. 
In 2016, Cogziant (Setlur, Rajendran, & Ravi, 2016) conducted a survey on 30 
interviewees from global freight forwarders, shipping agents, shipping liners and 
technology providers, to elucidate the barriers that hold back the emergence of e-
commerce in shipping organizations. The respondents described some of the reasons 
are the priorities in their business competition, the lack of management understanding, 
the shortage of adequate IT infrastructure, the poor performance of implementation 
skills, no strong business care, and the concern about security (see Figure 22). To be 
more specific, the main reason for the slowdown of e-commerce to the shipping 
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industry is the decision for investment which is critical to any shipping companies. It 
is challenging to justify whether e-commerce is crucial to invest and promising for 
profit returns. The shipping enterprises face a variety of competing priorities, for 
instance, procuring assets including containers, vessels, handling facilities and many 
other intensive capital-purchases. Shipping organizations are also challenged by the 
lack of adequate IT infrastructure and the skills for implementation. 
 
Figure 22. The barriers for the adoption of e-commerce in container shipping 
companies   
Source: Setlur et al. (2016) 
 
The survey also reveals the operational challenges of the shipping organizations 
with e-commerce platform (see Figure 23). Sixty percent of the respondents illustrated 
that the lack of a standardized process results in the inefficient manual process in the 
organization. The issue of data quality together with personnel training and 
development are common obstacles to the adoption of an e-commerce platform. The 
lack of timely information accounts for some small proportion for that reason; 
however, it is also a critical point to address.  
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Figure 23. The operational challenges for adoption of e-commerce in container 
shipping companies 
Source: Setlur et al. (2016) 
 
A recent study conducted by Informa Engage, the sister company of Lloyd’s List 
Container, shipping leaders were asked to grade the importance of digitalization in 
their respective businesses (Lloyd's List, 2019). Thirteen percent of the shipping 
leaders claimed that digital strategy is “extremely important” whilst 52% indicated 
that it is “very important”. Especially, digital technology is listed as the top list of the 
solutions for all the major challenges and identified operation costs. In this survey, the 
respondents also identified the biggest barrier to invest in digitalization was the 
challenge in adopting new with existing technology. Fifteen percent of the respondents 
suspected about the suit of technology to their business. Others claimed that it takes 
time to pay back the investment which turn digitalization to be considered as a cost 
rather than an investment. It was emphasized in the research that shipping companies 
are keen on digitalization; however, they are not willing to invest. Other reasons 
include: security problems, lack of trust and lack of skills.  
Similarly, container shipping lines integrated Electronic Data Interchange and 
extensive Electronic Data Processing systems in business operations. Nevertheless, e-
commerce has not intensively been applied. Despite the fact that the majority of large 
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shipping companies have their websites there are still barriers to implement a fully 
integrated e-commerce system. 
c. Dysfunctional online platform 
As mentioned in Table 1 of chapter 2, the top container shipping lines in the 
world, which account for an average of 85% of world container ship capacity, struggle 
to provide their customers with an e-commerce system to check for instant ocean 
freight. The notable e-commerce tools from the container shipping lines are Maersk 
Line with ship.maerskline.com and my.maerskline.com tools; CMA CGM with e-
Business suite, Hapag-Lloyd’s QuickQuotes tool. All the platforms require clients to 
register with username and passwords. It reflects a long way for clients to make use of 
the e-commerce tools in the shipping industry sector. Moreover, most carriers 
practically have no direct quoting or booking widget on their home pages. They are 
located in the “e-services” tab in the menu tools and require several mouse clicks to 
request a quote. Besides, more than half of the top 12 container lines create the 
functionality for rate quote request via electronic forms but hardly attempt to deliver 
instant quotes (Johnson, 2018). The customers do not only lack knowledge of IT but 
also currently get more challenges to struggle with the platform function. This results 
in the questions among the stakeholders, especially the small and medium sized 
companies about whether the carriers are interested in offering business transaction 
with online quoting platforms.  
 
(2) The willingness of some container shipping companies to start the online 
direct channel in current situation 
The emergence of e-booking creates a wide range of carriers for the selection of 
cargo owners. This is the essential factor for the automating ocean shipping. Looking 
at the current e-commerce activities in shipping company’s systems which is 
represented in Figure 24, the EDI booking system is noteworthily at high degrees of 
automation while freight payment, documentation and vessel scheduling are 




Figure 24. The level of automation in some critical functions  
Source: Setlur et al. (2016) 
 
In the mentioned survey (Setlur et al., 2016), the recognition of stakeholders to 
the importance of e-commerce as well as the adoption of it to the automating shipping 
processes are reflected in documentation and freight payments, rate shopping, 
shipment booking and vessel schedules. Container shipping companies struggle to not 
only maintain the ongoing business but also to keep track of updated innovative 
technologies. Shipping companies mostly use their website to offer several 
sophisticated services without more advanced business transactions. E-commerce has 
supported for efficiency improvements and cost reduction, said the representatives of 
Maersk in 2018 Sustainability Report (Maersk, 2018). In this report, Maersk also 
expected to achieve 30% of their revenues from e-commerce logistics from small and 
medium-sized customers by 2025. 
It is challenging to foretell about the future use of the e-commerce in accordance 
with the development of the shipping industry when information and communication 
technology are changing drastically. Nevertheless, it is clear that the shipping 
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companies will continue to develop in their own Internet-based portal to promote more 
sophisticated stages of e-commerce as an effective tool and prominent services for 
online booking, cargo tracking and tracing, and legal shipping documentation. 
INTTRA is undoubtedly a unique asset that strengthens the power of liner carriers. 
Maritime transportation is characterized with enormous information flowing 
among parties involved. Essentially, information and communication technologies 
play a crucial role in the CSI. In a few years, more e-commerce volume is expected to 
be handled though shipping lines’ portals due to an increase in the range of contract 
cargo being undertaken via Internet. However, shipping companies now process their 
bookings in different systems and formats (third party software or their own websites), 
and it turns out to be challenging for infomediary marketplaces to sustain the services. 
In this sense, buy-side e-commerce and third-party marketplaces tend to be dismissed 
to niche markets.  
 
(3) The recommendations for the container shipping company to improve 
the cargo owners’ preference for online direct channel 
In order to promote e-commerce transformation in the container industry, a clear 
agenda with strategic vision needs to be obtained. CMA-CGM, Hapag-Lloyd and 
Maersk Line are the first enterprises with clear digital visions. Container shipping lines 
should consider these issues to develop and enhance the efficiency and effectiveness 
of online channels. 
a. Develop a digital vision  
No matter whether the carriers are the e-commerce leaders or the back-up 
followers, they essentially need a clear ambition and systematic vision for this 
transformation with the targeted goals and an implementation timeline. With the 
emergence of potential opportunities and risks, the carriers can take advantage of the 
chances and prioritize the selected actions-to-do. 
b. Commit to rapid adoption  
A rapid and bold digital adoption supports to develop a viable solution and create 
values for external and internal stakeholders. For example,  
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- Customer online experience: The online booking platform to prove instant 
quotes for the customers is intricated, notably for the shipments with intermodal 
transport. A resilient IT infrastructure with frequent updated dynamic price description 
for a variety of services and its quotations is crucial. It follows by real time reports of 
the conditions and locations of the shipments, particularly refrigerated cargo. A proper 
online experience for the customers is also the key point to raise the customer 
preference to online channels. 
- Sale Force Effectiveness: The carriers can take advantage of the customer data 
which they have acquired to classify customers to segment and target the customer 
base. Thereby, the sales team are able to identify the individual demands and improve 
customer loyalty. 
- Dynamic Pricing: Advanced analytics for a dynamically adjusting price system 
is essential. The carrier can take advantage of pricing engine with historical data to 
estimate the prompt pricing system according to the season with high demand or the 
utilization of the carriers for each journey. As reported, dynamic pricing can improve 
profits by 3 to 5% (Egloff, Sanders, Riedl, Mohottala & Georgaki, 2018). 
c. Lay the foundation: The carriers should have a solid commitment to settle 
digital capabilities in the enterprises.  
- Structure and processes: It is essential to have a cross-functional innovation 
team for the end-to-end digital transformation concentrates on the innovation of the 
project. KPIs and incentives should be set up for the entrepreneur’s culture to 
acknowledge the risk and rewards for the successful ideas of innovation.  
- People: Digital skills, especially IT, are necessary to build up e-commerce 
capabilities throughout support functions, commercial and operational. A mechanism 
to recruit talents such as data modeler, data scientist and web designer is needed in the 
competitive digital market.  
- Data and systems: A modernized system with robust and comprehensive data 
and digital architecture which permits the IT and digital functions to accommodate 
with most-updated technologies should be available.  
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- Change management: A sharp and realistic approach to the new management 
is required to proceed digital technologies instead of the traditional work styles 
considering how the organization can accommodate and make sure that the digital 
adoption is sustained. 
d. Develop outside the main organization 
A distinct and separated team from the organization will assist ingenious 
offerings and discover creative ways to tackle the core operations of the organization. 
This build-operate-transfer-approach will spearhead the technology transformation for 
best-practice. A collaboration between both team’s effort and corporate’s operations 
will promote the pace of digitalization.  
In conclusion, in order to gain in the digital era, the carrier must be willing to 
dedicate resources and time. Most carriers are still reluctant as they have no overall 
vision or imperative plans for the technology adoption. The carriers can conquer the 
barriers from organizational hurdles and the shortage of digital capabilities and skilled 
officers when they are dedicated to explore digital opportunities in depth. Besides, the 
Internet entry timing is decided by the cargo owners’ preference for online direct 
channels. The container shipping company will also benefit from the online direct 
channel when the margin between w and v is increased. The effects of v and w on 
pricies and profits will also be analysed in the following section. 
 
2. The container shipping company should adopt various pricing strategy 
in different e-commerce evolvement stages 
The setting of online direct price should not be equal to offline retail price or 
be randomly decided. The random pricing strategy will definitely lead to serious 
results, such as customer and profit loss. The online direct price is dynamic with 
changing online unit cost. As discussed in chapter 3, the container shipping company 
has different online and offline unit costs in various e-commerce evolvement stages. 
It is regarded that the online unit cost will decrease with deeper e-commerce 
engagement. 
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After assigning a specific value for θ (θ 0.98), a new numerical example is 
conducted to examine the effects of c  on Nash equilibrium results, as shown in Figure 
25 and Table 13. The programming contents for the numerical example are listed in 
Appendix B. The container shipping company should adopt the online direct price in 
Nash equilibrium results if they aim to maximize the profit in a decentralized supply 
chain.  
 
Figure 25. Effects of c  on π, Q, P where θ 0.98 
 
Table 13. Effects of c  on π, Q, P where θ 0.98 
 
 
(1) When c  stands at 1270, which is exactly the current situation for the 
container shipping company (c c 1200), it is a dilemma. The high online unit 
cost is inevitable because of the huge initial investment on IT, and technology. If the 
container shipping company only aims to maximize the profit as is assumed here, the 
optimal online direct price has to be increased to compensate the high online unit cost. 
Correspondingly, the NVOCC/freight forwarder is also prone to increase the offline 
retail price. Finally, the cargo owners will move to other sellers because there are more 
than one container shipping company and NVOCC/freight forwarder in reality. For 
the container shipping company who acts as the pioneer of e-commerce in CSI, if they 
adopt the Nash equilibrium online direct price like this, they will definitely suffer 
            Cd 1000 1009 1018 1027 1036 1045 1054 1063 1072 1081 1090 1099 1108 1117 1126 1135 1144 1153 1162 1171 1180 1189 1198 1207 1216 1225 1234 1243 1252 1261 1270
Pd 1448.8 1448.8 1448.8 1448.8 1448.8 1448.8 1448.8 1448.8 1448.8 1448.8 1448.8 1448.8 1448.8 1448.8 1448.8 1448.8 1448.8 1448.8 1448.8 1448.8 1448.8 1448.8 1448.8 1448.8 1448.8 1448.8 1452.3 1458.3 1464.3 1470.3 1476.3
Pr 1480.0 1480.0 1480.0 1480.0 1480.0 1480.0 1480.0 1480.0 1480.0 1480.0 1480.0 1480.0 1480.0 1480.0 1480.0 1480.0 1480.0 1480.0 1480.0 1480.0 1480.0 1480.0 1480.0 1480.0 1480.0 1480.0 1481.7 1484.7 1487.7 1490.7 1493.7
Q d 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
Q r 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9
πm 249.8 248.0 246.2 244.4 242.6 240.8 239.0 237.2 235.4 233.6 231.8 230.0 228.2 226.4 224.6 222.8 221.0 219.2 217.4 215.6 213.8 212.0 210.2 208.4 206.6 204.8 203.3 202.3 201.5 200.9 200.4
πr 64.0 64.0 64.0 64.0 64.0 64.0 64.0 64.0 64.0 64.0 64.0 64.0 64.0 64.0 64.0 64.0 64.0 64.0 64.0 64.0 64.0 64.0 64.0 64.0 64.0 64.0 100.2 107.7 115.5 123.5 131.8
πs 313.8 312.0 310.2 308.4 306.6 304.8 303.0 301.2 299.4 297.6 295.8 294.0 292.2 290.4 288.6 286.8 285.0 283.2 281.4 279.6 277.8 276.0 274.2 272.4 270.6 268.8 303.5 310.0 317.0 324.3 332.2
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customer losses. Maximizing profit is, however, not their only goal. The container 
shipping company should be very prudent in setting the online direct price to balance 
the market share and profit. It seems inevitably for them to sacrifice some profits and 
even lose money initially if they insist on exploring the online direct channel in current 
situation. 
(2) When c  decreases in this interval c ∈ 1225,1270 , the Nash equilibrium 
results of online direct price also decrease. The profit of the container shipping 
company also rises slightly. Moreover, the Nash equilibrium results of online direct 
price are lower than offline retail price in this interval of c . The container shipping 
company competes with the NVOCC/freight forwarder in this situation through the 
online direct platform in this situation. 
(3) When c  decreases in this interval c ∈ 1000,1225 , the Nash equilibrium 
results of prices and demand for two channels are unchanged even if c  keeps 
decreasing. The container shipping company can enjoy more profits because of the 
reduced online unit price and stable demand for the online direct channel.  
 
4.3. The effects of consumers’ valuation of container shipping service, 
wholesale price and unit cost on pricing strategy and profits 
Though only the route from the Far East to North Europe has been considered as 
an example, the findings of this dissertation are still of importance. The reason is the 
main difference between various routes are just reflected on different margins among 
unit cost c , wholesale price w and consumers’ valuaction v.  
In order to simplify the numerical examples, it is assumed that online unit cost 
c 	equals offline unit cost c . Therefore, only offline unit cost c  in chapter 4.3 is 
mentioned. Moreover, Variables θ, 	b  and b  are assigned with uniform value in 
chapter 4.3 as follows, and the other variables’ assignment differs in scenarios. 
θ 0.98, b 100, b 50, c c   
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4.3.1. The effects of consumers’ valuation of container shipping service and 
wholesale price on pricing strategy and profits 
Two scenarios with changing margins wholesale price w and consumers’ valuation 
v are analyzed. The realistic meanings in the CSI are: How should the container 
shipping company adjust the optimal online direct price when consumer’ valuation v 
changes? What are the impacts on the online direct price and profit if wholesale price 
w shows no change or change in proportion at the same time? 
 
1. Scenario 1: The market’s fluctuation leads to the change of consumers’ 
valuation of container shipping service v without fluctuation of wholesale price w and 
unit cost c . Related varibales are assigned as follows and the programming contents 
in matlab for this numerical example are listed in Appendix C.  
v ∈ 1500, 1600 , w 1400, c c 1200  
When the market goes up, it means that the cargo owners’ estimated valuation of 
container shipping service increases, and vice versa. Figure 26 and Table 14 indicate 
the effects of v on the pricing strategy and profts. 
 
Figure 26. Effects of v on the pricing strategy and profits 
 
Table 14. Effects of v on the pricing strategy and profits 
 
             v 1500 1505 1510 1515 1520 1525 1530 1535 1540 1545 1550 1555 1560 1565 1570 1575 1580 1585 1590 1595 1600
Pd 1440 1440 1440 1440 1440 1445 1450 1455 1460 1465 1470 1475 1480 1485 1490 1495 1500 1505 1510 1515 1520
Pr 1460 1460 1460 1460 1460 1462.5 1465 1467.5 1470 1472.5 1475 1477.5 1480 1482.5 1485 1487.5 1490 1492.5 1495 1497.5 1500
Q d 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.3750 0.3500 0.3250 0.3000 0.2750 0.2500 0.2250 0.2000 0.1750 0.1500 0.1250 0.1000 0.0750 0.0500 0.0250 0.0000
Q r 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6250 0.6500 0.6750 0.7000 0.7250 0.7500 0.7750 0.8000 0.8250 0.8500 0.8750 0.9000 0.9250 0.9500 0.9750 1.0000
πm 216 216 216 216 216 216.875 217.5 217.875 218 217.875 217.5 216.875 216 214.875 213.5 211.875 210 207.875 205.5 202.875 200
πr 54 54 54 54 54 39.0625 42.25 45.5625 49 52.5625 56.25 60.0625 64 68.0625 72.25 76.5625 81 85.5625 90.25 95.0625 100
πs 270 270 270 270 270 255.938 259.75 263.438 267 270.438 273.75 276.938 280 282.938 285.75 288.438 291 293.438 295.75 297.938 300
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(1) When the market goes down (v ∈ 1500, 1560 , the container shipping 
company and the NVOCC/freight forwarder both suffer profit losses. The optimal 
online and offline prices also drop when the market goes down. Though they change 
as was expected, the process of changes is complex, as explained below. 
a. Optimal online direct price is lower than optimal offline retail price. Optimal 
online direct price decreases from 1480 to 1440 when v decreases in the interval (v ∈
1520, 1560 . Then optimal online direct price becomes stable at 1440 even if v 
keeps dropping (v ∈ 1500, 1520 . 
b. The demand for online direct channel increases from 0.2 to 0.4 when v 
decreases in the interval (v ∈ 1520, 1560  and becomes stable at 0.4 when v keeps 
dropping (v ∈ 1500, 1520 . 
c. The profit of container shipping company increases slightly from 216 to 218 
when v decreases in the interval (v ∈ 1540, 1560 . However, it drops slightly from 
218 to 216 when v keeps decreasing in the interval (v ∈ 1520, 1540  and them stay 
stable at 216 when v keeps decreasing in the interval (v ∈ 1500, 1520 . 
(2) When the market goes up (v ∈ 1560, 1600 , the optimal online and offline 
prices also increase as expected. However, both the container shipping company and 
the NVOCC/freight forwarder do not enjoy more profits from the increasing market 
as expected. The container shipping company even suffers profit loss. The process of 
changes is concluded as follows: 
a. Optimal online direct price becomes greater than optimal offline retail price 
when market goes up. Optimal online direct price increases from 1480 to 1520 when 
v keeps rising in the interval (v ∈ 1560, 1600 .  
b. The demand for online direct channel decreases from 0.2 to 0 when v 
decreases in the interval (v ∈ 1560, 1600 . 
c. The profit of the container shipping company decreases from 216 to 200 when 
v  decreases in the interval ( v ∈ 1540, 1560 . However, the profit of the 
NVOCC/freight forwarder increases from 64 to 100. The NVOCC/freight forwarder 
benefits from the increasing market because of the following reasons. The wholesale 
price offered by the container shipping company to the NVOCC/freight forwarder has 
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not increased correspondingly, and the offline retail price is induced to increase 
because of the rise of the online direct price. Moreover, the profits of the whole supply 
chain will increase as expected.   
 
2. Scenario 2: The market’s fluctuation leads to the change of consumers’ 
valuation of container shipping service v, and wholesale price w changes in proportion 
without change of units cost c . Related variables are assigned as follows and the 
programming contents in Matlab for this numerical example are listed in Appendix D. 
			v ∈ 1500, 1800 , w 14/15v, c c 1200  
Different from scenario 1, the cargo owners’ estimated valuation of container 
shipping service v  and the wholesale price w  which is offered by the container 
shipping company to the NVOCC/freight forwarder fluctuates in proportion. Figure 
27 and Table 15 present the effects of v and w on the pricing strategy and proftis. 
 
Figure 27. Effects of v and w on the pricing strategy and profits 
 
Table 15. Effects of v and w on the pricing strategy and profits 
 
 
(1) When the market goes down (v ∈ 1500, 1560 , the container shipping 
company and the NVOCC/freight forwarder both suffer profit losses. The optimal 
             v 1500 1515 1530 1545 1560 1575 1590 1605 1620 1635 1650 1665 1680 1695 1710 1725 1740 1755 1770 1785 1800
Pd 1420 1435 1450 1465 1480 1495 1510 1525 1540 1555 1570 1585 1600 1615 1630 1645 1660 1675 1690 1705 1720
Pr 1423.08 1437.31 1451.54 1465.77 1480 1494.23 1508.46 1522.69 1536.92 1551.15 1565.38 1579.62 1593.85 1608.08 1622.31 1636.54 1650.77 1665 1679.23 1693.46 1707.69
Q d 0.2231 0.2154 0.2077 0.2000 0.1923 0.1846 0.1769 0.1692 0.1615 0.1538 0.1462 0.1385 0.1308 0.1231 0.1154 0.1077 0.1000 0.0923 0.0846 0.0769 0.0000
Q r 0.7692 0.7769 0.7846 0.7923 0.8000 0.8077 0.8154 0.8231 0.8308 0.8385 0.8462 0.8538 0.8615 0.8692 0.8769 0.8846 0.8923 0.9000 0.9077 0.9154 0.9231
πm 163.195 176.432 189.645 202.834 216 229.142 242.26 255.355 268.426 281.473 294.497 307.497 320.473 333.426 346.355 359.26 372.142 385 397.834 410.645 423.432
πr 59.1716 60.3609 61.5621 62.7751 64 65.2367 66.4852 67.7456 69.0178 70.3018 71.5976 72.9053 74.2249 75.5562 76.8994 78.2544 79.6213 81 82.3905 83.7929 85.2071
πs 222.367 236.793 251.207 265.609 280 294.379 308.746 323.101 337.444 351.775 366.095 380.402 394.698 408.982 423.254 437.515 451.763 466 480.225 494.438 508.639
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online and offline prices also drop when the market goes down. All of them are 
changed as follows: 
a. Optimal online direct price is lower than optimal offline retail price. Compared 
with scenario 1, the optimal online direct price decreases more remarkably from 1480 
to 1420. 
b. The demand for online direct channel increases slightly from 0.2 to 0.22. 
c. The profit of the container shipping company decreases more largely from 216 
to 163 when v decreases in the interval (v ∈ 1500, 1560  when compared with 
scenario. 
 
(2) When the market goes up (v ∈ 1560, 1800 , the optimal online and offline 
prices also increase as expected. However, both the container shipping company and 
the NVOCC/freight forwarder cannot enjoy more profits from the increasing market 
as expected. The container shipping company even suffers profit loss. The process of 
changes is concluded as follows. 
a. Optimal online direct price becomes greater than the optimal offline retail 
price when the market goes up. Optimal online direct price increases from 1480 to 
1720 when v keeps rising.  
b. The demand for online direct channel decreases from 0.2 to 0 when v keeps 
increasing. 
c. Both the container shipping company and the NVOCC/freight forwarder 
benefit from the increasing market because the wholesale price w increases with v in 
proportion. 
 
4.3.2. The effects of unit cost and wholesale price on pricing strategy and 
profits 
Similar to chapter 4.31, two scenarios changing margins between unit cost c  and 
wholesale price w are put forward. The correspondent meanings in the CSI is how 
should the container shipping company adjust the optimal online direct price when the 
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unit cost c  is reduced or increased? What are the impacts on the online direct price 
and profit if wholesale price w has no change or change in proportion at the same time?  
 
1. Scenario 1: Unit cost  change without fluctuation in the consumers’ 
valuation of container shipping service  and wholesale price  
Lots of factors can reduce the unit cost in reality, such as the improvement of the 
slot utility of containerships and the reduction of the operating cost. Similarly, the 
reduction of slot utility of containerships and the increase of operating cost will 
increase the unit cost. Therefore, it is more meaningful to discuss the change of optimal 
price strategy and profits when unit cost fluctuates. Related variables are assigned as 
follows and the programming contents in Matlab for this numerical example are listed 
in Appendix E. Figure 28 shows the effects of c  on the pricing strategy and profits. 
v 1560, w 1400, c c ∈ 1000,1300   
 
Figure 28. Effects of c  on the pricing strategy and profits 
 
It is apparent that NVOCC/freight forwarder is not affected in this scenario 
because of unchanged wholesale price and offline retail price. The optimal online 
direct price for container shipping company stays stable, which means there is no need 
for container shipping company to change the online direct price in this situation. The 
profit of container shipping company is positively correlated with the unit cost. 
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2. Scenario 2: Unit cost  and  change in proportion without fluctuation 
in the consumers’ valuation of container shipping service . Related variables are 
assigned as follows and the programming contents in Matlab for this numerical 
example are listed in appendix F. 
v 1560, w ∗ c , c c ∈ 1180,1260   
In contrast to scenario 1, the wholesale price w offered by contaienr shippping 
company to NVOCC/freight forwarder and unit cost c  change in proportion. Figure 
29 and Table 16 illustrate the effects of unit cost c  and w on the pricing strategy and 
profits. 
 
Figure 29. Effects of c  and w on the pricing strategy and profits. 
 
Table 16. Effects of c  and w on the pricing strategy and profits. 
 
 
When the unit cost is reduced ( c ∈ 1180, 1200 , the changes of Nash 
equilibrium results are concluded as follows.  
a. Different with the unchanged and equal optimal online direct and offline retail 
price. The optimal prices differ and change more obviously in this scenario. Optimal 
online direct price becomes lower than optimal offline retail channel when unit cost is 
increased. Optimal online direct price is unchanged when unit cost rise in the interval 
            Cr 1180 1184 1188 1192 1196 1200 1204 1208 1212 1216 1220 1224 1228 1232 1236 1240 1244 1248 1252 1256 1260
Pd 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480 1482 1486.67 1491.33 1496 1500.67 1505.33 1510
Pr 1468.33 1470.67 1473 1475.33 1477.67 1480 1482.33 1484.67 1487 1489.33 1491.67 1494 1496.33 1498.67 1502 1506.67 1511.33 1516 1520.67 1525.33 1530
Q d 0.08333 0.10667 0.13 0.15333 0.17667 0.2 0.22333 0.24667 0.27 0.29333 0.31667 0.34 0.36333 0.38667 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Q r 0.91667 0.89333 0.87 0.84667 0.82333 0.8 0.77667 0.75333 0.73 0.70667 0.68333 0.66 0.63667 0.61333 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
πm 205.278 207.858 210.22 212.364 214.291 216 217.491 218.764 219.82 220.658 221.278 221.68 221.864 221.831 222 222.667 223.333 224 224.667 225.333 226
πr 84.0278 79.8044 75.69 71.6844 67.7878 64 60.3211 56.7511 53.29 49.9378 46.6944 43.56 40.5344 37.6178 54 54 54 54 54 54 54
πs 289.306 287.662 285.91 284.049 282.079 280 277.812 275.516 273.11 270.596 267.972 265.24 262.399 259.449 276 276.667 277.333 278 278.667 279.333 280
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(c ∈ 1200, 1232 , but it starts to increase when unit cost increase in the interval 
(c ∈ 1230, 1260 . 
b. The demand for online direct channel increases from 0.2 to 0.4 when unit cost 
increases in the interval: c ∈ 1200, 1232 . Then it becomes stable even if the unit 
cost keeps increasing in the interval: c ∈ 1232, 1260 . 
c. In stark contrast to scenario 1, the Nash equilibriums results of profits do not 
change much. Container shipping company’s profit increase and NVOCC/freight 
forwarder ’s profit decreases when unit cost rises in the interval: c ∈ 1200, 1260 . 
The main reason is the proportionally changed wholesale price. Moreover, the profits 
of supply chain are reduced slightly in the interval: c ∈ 1200, 1232  and improved 
slightly in the interval: c ∈ 1232, 1260 . 
 
4.4. Summary 
Based on the variable’s assignment with reference to the data in CSI, the effects 
of five independent variables on the pricing strategy and profits are examined 
respectively by several numerical examples in this chapter. 
In chapter 4.2, the effects of online unit cost and consumer preference for the 
online direct channel on the pricing strategy and profits were discussed. After 
conducting the numerical examples, the findings and implication for the container 
shipping company are summarized correspondingly. The results of numerical 
examples show that the container shipping company has not yet entered into the e-
commerce because of the low consumer preference for the online direct channel right 
now. The reasons for the low preference are discussed and the recommendations for 
the improvement of preference are put forward. On the other hand, the results of 
numerical examples present the dynamic Nash equilibrium results of the online direct 
price under the changing online unit cost. The Nash equilibrium results of the online 
direct price were sometimes surprisingly different from expectation. 
Chapter 4.3, discussed the effects of unit cost, consumers’ valuation of container 
shipping services and wholesale price offered by the container shipping company to 
the NVOCC/freight forwarder on the pricing strategy and profits. Consumers’ 
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valuation of container shipping services reflects the fluctuation of the freight market 
in reality and it is a factor normally uncontrollable by the container shipping company. 
Two scenarios with changing consumers’ valuation of container shipping services are 
put forward to reflect the fluctuation of freight in reality, and correspondent numerical 
examples are conducted. The results of numerical examples propose dynamic optimal 
online direct price for the container shipping company. Moreover, the results indicate 
that the container shipping company will not definitely benefit from the increasing 
market but may suffer the loss from the decreasing market if the wholesale price 
changes in proportion. Different from consumers’ valuation of container shipping 
services, the container shipping company’s unit cost is a factor more controllable by 
the container shipping company. Two scenarios with changing unit cost are put 
forward, and correspondent numerical examples are implemented. Similarly, the 
results of numerical examples propose dynamic optimal online direct price for the 
container shipping company. Moreover, the results indicate that the container shipping 
company will not definitely lose from the increasing unit cost but may benefit from 
the decreasing unit cost if the wholesale price changes in proportion. 
In conclusion, the numerical examples verify that the optimal online direct price 
should be settled prudently considering all the independent variables. If the container 
shipping company sets the online direct price randomly or unreasonably, the profits 
and market share will suffer loss. The Nash equilibrium results propose the optimal 
online direct price as reference for the container shipping company’s pricing strategy, 














Chapter 5  
 
The main results, contribution and limitations of this dissertation are concluded 
in this chapter.    
 
5.1. Summary 
Firstly, the dissertation summarizes the prevailing research of pricing strategy in 
the dual-channel supply chain, especially the studies that apply the Nash equilibrium 
game theory and consumer utility theory. Based on that, related achievement and 
theories are applied in CSI. The four questions listed in chapter 1.2 are finally 
discussed and answered in chapter 3 and chapter 4. 
In chapter 3.1 and 3.3.1, the first question listed in chapter 1.2 is answered: What 
are the factors influencing the pricing strategy and profits of container shipping 
company and NVOCC/freight forwarder in the decentralized dual-channel supply 
chain? Seven factors influencing the pricing strategy and profits of the container 
shipping company and the NVOCC/freight forwarder in a decentralize dual-channel 
supply chain in CSI are put forward and discussed in-depth. Furthermore, those seven 
influencing factors are used as the inputs of the profit models. 
In order to answer the second question listed in chapter 1.2: What are the Nash 
equilibrium results of optimal online direct and offline retail prices for the container 
shipping company and the NVOCC/freight forwarder respectively in the decentralized 
dual-channel supply chain? The following work is fulfilled in chapter 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5. 
Firstly, the conceptual dual-channel supply chain with one container shipping 
company and one NVOCC/freight forwarder is established. Secondly, the 
optimization theory, the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium game theory and the 
 101
consumer utility theory are applied synthetically to construct profit models for the 
container shipping company and the NCOCC/freight forwarder. Then, Nash 
equilibrium results of prices, demands and profits are derived. The Nash equilibrium 
results of the online direct price are the proposed pricing strategy for the container 
shipping company to maximize their profits in the dual-channel supply chain. 
In chapter 4.2, the third question listed in chapter 1.2 is answered through several 
numerical examples: What are the implications of the Nash equilibrium results for a 
container shipping company? The findings indicated that the container shipping 
company would only benefit from the online direct channel when the cargo owners’ 
preference for online channel is close to the traditional offline retail channel. 
Obviously, the online direct channel has not yet been developed for the container 
shipping company to enter into e-commerce because of low consumer preference for 
the online direct channel now. Container shipping companies cannot benefit from the 
online direct channel because of the high investment on the establishment of an online 
platform. Nevertheless, some container shipping companies act as the pioneers in the 
e-commerce evolvement progress because of the enormous advantages from the online 
channel such as the reduction in cost of sales, the access of all customers to container 
shipping companies (customer-oriented goal) and the structured data management via 
online transactions.  
In order to answer the fourth question listed in chapter 1.2: What are the impacts 
of influencing factors’ changes on the pricing strategy and profits of container shipping 
companies and NVOCC/freight forwarders? Effects of five influencing factors’ 
changes on the pricing strategy and profits of the container shipping company and the 
NVOCC/freight forwarders are analyzed through numerical examples. The specific 
pricing strategy for the container shipping company is proposed under different 
variables assignment. On the one hand, it is verified that the impacts of opening the 
online direct channel on the container shipping company and the NVOCC/freight 
forwarder are dynamic. Container shipping companies may benefit or lose depending 
on various market situations and conditions. On the other hand, it is verified that the 
optimal online direct price should not be settled randomly. It differs when independent 
 102
variables change. Container shipping companies should be cautious about the pricing 




This is the first time that the dual-channel supply chain management is applied 
in CSI to analyze the impacts of online direct channel on the pricing strategy and 
profits of the container shipping company and the NVOCC/freight forwarder. The 
contribution can be summarized as follows: 
(1) The dual-channel supply chain management CSI should successfully be 
applied with some modifications. A dual-channel supply chain in CSI with one 
container shipping company and one NVOCC/freight forwarder is constructed to be 
the research object. The optimization theory, non-cooperative game theory and 
consumer utility theory are applied synthetically for model construction in this study. 
After the model construction and optimization, a relevant decision-making framework 
for the container shipping company is established. The pricing strategy for the 
container shipping company in the dual-channel supply chain is proposed. 
Furthermore, the effects of independent variables on the pricing strategy and profits 
are also analyzed to propose more implications for the container shipping company. 
(2) The research results and findings provide theoretical support for the analysis 
and understanding of the relationship between the container shipping company and the 
NVOCC/freight forwarder in the network environment.  
(3) The established model and optimization decision could be a very useful 
reference to the pricing strategy for the container shipping company. 
 
5.3. Limitations and further study areas 
The present dissertation constructs a simplified and conceptual dual-channel 
supply chain in CSI, and profit models for the container shipping company and the 
NVOCC/freight forwarder are established with various assumptions. All the 
simplications, conceptual work and assumptions lead to the difference between the 
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models in the dissertation and the complex reality in CSI. Therefore, limitations are 
inevitable because the models in the dissertation cannot reflect the reality perfectly. 
The limitations worth further research are listed in the following. 
 
1. The limitations for the conceptual dual-channel supply chain in CSI in 
chapter 3 
(1) Lack of reference to the third-party e-commerce platform in the dual-
channel supply chain 
For the online channel, only the online direct channel in which the container 
shipping company sells the container shipping service directly to cargo owners through 
their own online platform was discussed. However, the third-party e-commerce 
platform also exists in reality. The third-party e-commerce platform is not mentioned 
in the dissertation. The reason is that the e-commerce in CSI is at an emerging stage 
now. The online transaction volumes are low in both the container shipping company’s 
own platform and third-party e-commerce platform. However, the third-party e-
commerce platform should be considered for further studies with the development of 
e-commerce in CSI. 
(2) Only one container shipping company and one NVOCC/freight 
forwarder are considered in the conceptual dual-channel supply chain. 
Some container shipping companies have already opened the online direct channel, 
while most of the top 12 container liners adopt the attitude of watching for the online 
direct channel. The more realistic situation is that the NVOCC/freight forwarder is 
faced with two competitive container shipping companies, one of which has online 
direct and offline retail channels and the other one which has only an offline retail 
channel. What is more, the pricing strategy and profits for the container shipping 
company and the NVOCC/freight forwarder will be totally different in that situation. 
It will be more valuable to discuss that situation in the future study.  
(3) Lack of study on centralized dual-channel supply chain 
In the dissertation, only the decentralized dual-channel supply chain is discussed 
because there is no cooperation on online and offline pricing between the container 
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shipping company and the NVOCC/freight forwarder at present. However, the 
cooperation between them is inevitable with the development of e-commerce in CSI. 
Therefore, it is more proactive to study what the pricing strategy is for the two parties 
in a centralized dual-channel supply chain, and what the optimal coordination contract 
is for them to improve the profits of the whole supply chain in CSI. 
 
2. The limitations for models’ construction and optimization in chapter 3 
(1) Only part of influencing factors is selected as inputs of the models 
Only some of the factors influencing the pricing strategy and profits in the dual-
channel supply chain are selected as the inputs of models in CSI. The risk preferences 
of stakeholders in the dual-channel supply chain are not considered in this dissertation. 
It was just simply assumed that all the stakeholders are risk-neutral. Furthermore, the 
demand is assumed fixed in the dissertation in order to simplify the model construction 
and optimization. Obviously, it cannot reflect the reality in CSI. In conclusion, the 
previous two factors deserve more research in the future.  
(2) Lack of the discussion on the situation that the wholesale price is decided 
by container shipping company  
It is assumed that the wholesale price is given by the market and the container 
shipping company has no pricing power in the wholesale price in this dissertation. 
Though the whole CSI is regarded as an oligopoly market, the extent of oligopoly 
differs in different routes (Rau & Spinler, 2016; Sys, 2009). In some specific routes, it 
can be assumed that the container shipping company can set the wholesale price by 
himself. Therefore, it would be more inclusive to discuss the other situation when the 
wholesale price is decided by the container shipping company. In addition, the 
Stackelberg theory, not the Nash equilibrium theory is applied to study the pricing 
strategy in that situation.  
(3) The assumption that container shipping company and NVOCC/freight 
forwarder both have full information about each other does not comply with the 
reality 
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The assumption has no compliance with the reality in CSI. The pricing strategy for 
the container shipping company and the NVOCC/freight forwarder is influenced by 
various factors. It is impossible for them to obtain the other parties’ full information. 
For example, the effect of unit cost on the pricing strategy and profits was discussed 
in chapter 4.3.2. Normally, the unit cost is confidential information for the container 
shipping company. The NVOCC/freight forwarder cannot obtain the full information 
of that. It would be more realistic to change that assumption in further research. 
 
3. The limitations for numerical examples in chapter 4  
(1) The limitation of variable assignment 
Real market data in CSI for variables assignment was referred to. However, the data 
is provided by an international container shipping company operating both main 
trucking routes and continental trade lines. The pricing strategy proposed by the 
dissertation may not applicable to regional carriers who only operate on intra-region 
trade service. 
(2) Lack of sensitivity analysis of consumer purchase cost (  and  ) 
The effects of consumer online and offline purchase costs are not discussed as 
other inputs in the dissertation. It is difficult to obtain the real consumer purchase cost 
from the cargo owner as the basic scenario. That is the reason why a sensitivity analysis 
of consumer purchase cost ( b  and  b ) was not conducted. It would be more inclusive 
to supplement them in the future studies if we more detailed data of consumer purchase 
cost in CSI can be obtained. 
(3) The limited interval of consumer preference for online direct channel  
The consumer preference for the online direct channel is the relative preference 
to the offline retail channel. It is assumed that the consumer preference for the online 
direct channel changed from zero to one in the dissertation. When the consumer 
preference for the online direct channel equals one, it means cargo owners have the 
same preferences for both online direct and offline retail channels. It would be more 
realistic to discuss the situation that the consumer preference for the online direct 
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Appendix 1: Programming content of numerical examples in chapter 
4.2.1 
 
The effects of online unit cost c  and consumer preference for online direct channel θ 
















    for i=1:20     if(w<x(n)*v-b_d&&(1-x(n))*v+b_d<2*b_r&&b_d+b_r+c_d(i)-
c_r+(1-x(n))*v>=3/2*(v-w)) 
            P_d(n,i)=w+1./3.*(-b_d+2.*b_r+2.*c_d(i)-2.*c_r-(1-x(n)).*v); 
            P_r(n,i)=w+1/3*(b_d+b_r+c_d(i)-c_r+(1-x(n))*v); 
            Q_r(n,i)=(b_d+b_r+c_d(i)-c_r+(1-x(n))*v)/(3*b_r); 
            Q_d(n,i)=(-b_d+2*b_r-c_d(i)+c_r-(1-x(n))*v)/(3*b_r); 
T_r(n,i)=(b_d+b_r+c_d(i)-c_r+(1-x(n))*v)*(b_d+b_r+c_d(i)-c_r+(1-




            T(n,i)=T_r(n,i)+T_m(n,i); 
                else if(w<x(n)*v-b_d&&(1-x(n))*v+b_d<2*b_r&&b_d+b_r+c_d(i)-
c_r+(1-x(n))*v<3/2*(v-w)) 
                        P_d(n,i)=x(n)*v-b_d; 
                        P_r(n,i)=(v+w)/2; 
                        Q_r(n,i)=(v-w)/(2*b_r); 
                        Q_d(n,i)=(2*b_r-v+w)/(2*b_r); 
                        T_r(n,i)=(v-w)*(v-w)/(4*b_r); 
            T_m(n,i)=((2*b_r-v+w)*(x(n)*v-b_d-c_d(i))+(v-w)*(w-c_r))/(2*b_r); 
                        T(n,i)=T_r(n,i)+T_m(n,i); 
                    else if(w<x(n)*v-b_d&&(1-x(n))*v+b_d>=2*b_r) 
                            P_d(n,i)=w; 
                            P_r(n,i)=(1-x(n))*v+b_d-b_r+w; 
                            Q_r(n,i)=1; 
                            T_r(n,i)=(1-x(n))*v+b_d-b_r; 
                            T_m(n,i)=w-c_r; 
                            T(n,i)=T_r(n,i)+T_m(n,i); 
                end 
            end 
        end 
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    if(w<x*v-b_d&&(1-x)*v+b_d<2*b_r&&b_d+b_r+c_d(n)-c_r+(1-x)*v>=3/2*(v-
w)) 
                P_d(n)=w+1./3.*(-b_d+2.*b_r+2.*c_d(n)-2.*c_r-(1-x).*v); 
                P_r(n)=w+1/3*(b_d+b_r+c_d(n)-c_r+(1-x)*v); 
                Q_r(n)=(b_d+b_r+c_d(n)-c_r+(1-x)*v)/(3*b_r); 
                Q_d(n)=(-b_d+2*b_r-c_d(n)+c_r-(1-x)*v)/(3*b_r); 
                T_r(n)=(b_d+b_r+c_d(n)-c_r+(1-x).*v).*(b_d+b_r+c_d(n)-c_r+(1-
x).*v)./(6.*b_r); 
                T_m(n)=(b_d*b_d+4*b_r*b_r+b_r*(-4*v+9*w+4*v*x-4*c_d(n)-
5*c_r)+(v-v*x+c_d(n)-c_r)*(v-v*x+c_d(n)-c_r)-2*b_d*(-v+v*x+2*b_r-
c_d(n)+c_r))/(9*b_r); 
                T(n)=T_r(n)+T_m(n); 
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            else if(w<x*v-b_d&&(1-x)*v+b_d<2*b_r&&b_d+b_r+c_d(n)-c_r+(1-
x)*v<3/2*(v-w)) 
                    P_d(n)=x*v-b_d; 
                    P_r(n)=(v+w)/2; 
                    Q_r(n)=(v-w)/(2*b_r); 
                    Q_d(n)=(2*b_r-v+w)/(2*b_r); 
                    T_r(n)=(v-w)*(v-w)/(4*b_r); 
                    T_m(n)=((2*b_r-v+w)*(x*v-b_d-c_d(n))+(v-w)*(w-c_r))/(2*b_r); 
                    T(n)=T_r(n)+T_m(n); 
                else if(w<x*v-b_d&&(1-x)*v+b_d>=2*b_r) 
                        P_d(n)=w; 
                        P_r(n)=(1-x)*v+b_d-b_r+w; 
                        Q_r(n)=1; 
                        T_r(n)=(1-x)*v+b_d-b_r; 
                        T_m(n)=w-c_r; 
                        T(n)=T_r(n)+T_m(n); 
             end 
        end 
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The effects of consumers’ valuation of container shipping service	v on pricing 

















                P_d(n)=w+1./3.*(-b_d+2.*b_r+2.*c_d-2.*c_r-(1-x).*v(n)); 
                P_r(n)=w+1/3*(b_d+b_r+c_d-c_r+(1-x)*v(n)); 
                Q_r(n)=(b_d+b_r+c_d-c_r+(1-x)*v(n))/(3*b_r); 
                Q_d(n)=(-b_d+2*b_r-c_d+c_r-(1-x)*v(n))/(3*b_r);              




                T(n)=T_r(n)+T_m(n); 
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            else if(w<x*v(n)-b_d&&(1-x)*v(n)+b_d<2*b_r&&b_d+b_r+c_d-c_r+(1-
x)*v(n)<3/2*(v(n)-w)) 
                    P_d(n)=x*v(n)-b_d; 
                    P_r(n)=(v(n)+w)/2; 
                    Q_r(n)=(v(n)-w)/(2*b_r); 
                    Q_d(n)=(2*b_r-v(n)+w)/(2*b_r); 
                    T_r(n)=(v(n)-w)*(v(n)-w)/(4*b_r);                T_m(n)=((2*b_r-
v(n)+w)*(x*v(n)-b_d-c_d)+(v(n)-w)*(w-c_r))/(2*b_r); 
                    T(n)=T_r(n)+T_m(n); 
                else if(w<x*v(n)-b_d&&(1-x)*v(n)+b_d>=2*b_r) 
                        P_d(n)=w; 
                        P_r(n)=(1-x)*v(n)+b_d-b_r+w; 
                        Q_r(n)=1; 
                        T_r(n)=(1-x)*v(n)+b_d-b_r; 
                        T_m(n)=w-c_r; 
                        T(n)=T_r(n)+T_m(n); 
             end 
        end 
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The effects of consumers’ valuation of container shipping service v and wholesale 


















             P_d(n)=14/15.6*v(n)+1./3.*(-b_d+2.*b_r+2.*c_d-2.*c_r-(1-x).*v(n)); 
                P_r(n)=14/15.6*v(n)+1/3*(b_d+b_r+c_d-c_r+(1-x)*v(n)); 
                Q_r(n)=(b_d+b_r+c_d-c_r+(1-x)*v(n))/(3*b_r); 
                Q_d(n)=(-b_d+2*b_r-c_d+c_r-(1-x)*v(n))/(3*b_r);            





                T(n)=T_r(n)+T_m(n); 
            else if(14/15.6*v(n)<x*v(n)-b_d&&(1-x)*v(n)+b_d<2*b_r&&b_d+b_r+c_d-
c_r+(1-x)*v(n)<3/2*(v(n)-14/15.6*v(n))) 
                    P_d(n)=x*v(n)-b_d; 
                    P_r(n)=(v(n)+14/15.6*v(n))/2; 
                    Q_r(n)=(v(n)-14/15.6*v(n))/(2*b_r); 
                    Q_d(n)=(2*b_r-v(n)+14/15.6*v(n))/(2*b_r); 
                    T_r(n)=(v(n)-14/15.6*v(n))*(v(n)-14/15.6*v(n))/(4*b_r);        
T_m(n)=((2*b_r-v(n)+14/15.6*v(n))*(x*v(n)-b_d-c_d)+(v(n)-
14/15.6*v(n))*(14/15.6*v(n)-c_r))/(2*b_r); 
                    T(n)=T_r(n)+T_m(n); 
                else if(14/15.6*v(n)<x*v(n)-b_d&&(1-x)*v(n)+b_d>=2*b_r) 
                        P_d(n)=14/15.6*v(n); 
                        P_r(n)=(1-x)*v(n)+b_d-b_r+14/15.6*v(n); 
                        Q_r(n)=1; 
                        T_r(n)=(1-x)*v(n)+b_d-b_r; 
                        T_m(n)=14/15.6*v(n)-c_r; 
                        T(n)=T_r(n)+T_m(n); 
             end 
        end 
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                P_d(n)=w+1./3.*(-b_d+2.*b_r+2.*c_r(n)-2.*c_r(n)-(1-x).*v); 
                P_r(n)=w+1/3*(b_d+b_r+c_r(n)-c_r(n)+(1-x)*v); 
                Q_r(n)=(b_d+b_r+c_r(n)-c_r(n)+(1-x)*v)/(3*b_r); 
                Q_d(n)=(-b_d+2*b_r-c_r(n)+c_r(n)-(1-x)*v)/(3*b_r);           
T_r(n)=(b_d+b_r+c_r(n)-c_r(n)+(1-x).*v).*(b_d+b_r+c_r(n)-c_r(n)+(1-
x).*v)./(6.*b_r); 
                T_m(n)=(b_d*b_d+4*b_r*b_r+b_r*(-4*v+9*w+4*v*x-4*c_r(n)-
5*c_r(n))+(v-v*x+c_r(n)-c_r(n))*(v-v*x+c_r(n)-c_r(n))-2*b_d*(-v+v*x+2*b_r-
c_r(n)+c_r(n)))/(9*b_r); 
                T(n)=T_r(n)+T_m(n); 
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            else if(w<x*v-b_d&&(1-x)*v+b_d<2*b_r&&b_d+b_r+c_r(n)-c_r(n)+(1-
x)*v<3/2*(v-w)) 
                    P_d(n)=x*v-b_d; 
                    P_r(n)=(v+w)/2; 
                    Q_r(n)=(v-w)/(2*b_r); 
                    Q_d(n)=(2*b_r-v+w)/(2*b_r); 
                    T_r(n)=(v-w)*(v-w)/(4*b_r); 
          T_m(n)=((2*b_r-v+w)*(x*v-b_d-c_r(n))+(v-w)*(w-c_r(n)))/(2*b_r); 
                    T(n)=T_r(n)+T_m(n); 
                else if(w<x*v-b_d&&(1-x)*v+b_d>=2*b_r) 
                        P_d(n)=w; 
                        P_r(n)=(1-x)*v+b_d-b_r+w; 
                        Q_r(n)=1; 
                        T_r(n)=(1-x)*v+b_d-b_r; 
                        T_m(n)=w-c_r(n); 
                        T(n)=T_r(n)+T_m(n); 
             end 
        end 
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          P_d(n)=14/12*c_r(n)+1./3.*(-b_d+2.*b_r+2.*c_r(n)-2.*c_r(n)-(1-x).*v); 
                P_r(n)=14/12*c_r(n)+1/3*(b_d+b_r+c_r(n)-c_r(n)+(1-x)*v); 
                Q_r(n)=(b_d+b_r+c_r(n)-c_r(n)+(1-x)*v)/(3*b_r); 
                Q_d(n)=(-b_d+2*b_r-c_r(n)+c_r(n)-(1-x)*v)/(3*b_r);              
T_r(n)=(b_d+b_r+c_r(n)-c_r(n)+(1-x).*v).*(b_d+b_r+c_r(n)-c_r(n)+(1-
x).*v)./(6.*b_r); 
                T_m(n)=(b_d*b_d+4*b_r*b_r+b_r*(-4*v+9*14/12*c_r(n)+4*v*x-
4*c_r(n)-5*c_r(n))+(v-v*x+c_r(n)-c_r(n))*(v-v*x+c_r(n)-c_r(n))-2*b_d*(-
v+v*x+2*b_r-c_r(n)+c_r(n)))/(9*b_r); 
                T(n)=T_r(n)+T_m(n); 
            else if(14/12*c_r(n)<x*v-b_d&&(1-x)*v+b_d<2*b_r&&b_d+b_r+c_r(n)-
c_r(n)+(1-x)*v<3/2*(v-14/12*c_r(n))) 
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                    P_d(n)=x*v-b_d; 
                    P_r(n)=(v+14/12*c_r(n))/2; 
                    Q_r(n)=(v-14/12*c_r(n))/(2*b_r); 
                    Q_d(n)=(2*b_r-v+14/12*c_r(n))/(2*b_r); 
                    T_r(n)=(v-14/12*c_r(n))*(v-14/12*c_r(n))/(4*b_r);                    
T_m(n)=((2*b_r-v+14/12*c_r(n))*(x*v-b_d-c_r(n))+(v-
14/12*c_r(n))*(14/12*c_r(n)-c_r(n)))/(2*b_r); 
                    T(n)=T_r(n)+T_m(n); 
                else if(14/12*c_r(n)<x*v-b_d&&(1-x)*v+b_d>=2*b_r) 
                        P_d(n)=14/12*c_r(n); 
                        P_r(n)=(1-x)*v+b_d-b_r+14/12*c_r(n); 
                        Q_r(n)=1; 
                        T_r(n)=(1-x)*v+b_d-b_r; 
                        T_m(n)=14/12*c_r(n)-c_r(n); 
                        T(n)=T_r(n)+T_m(n); 
             end 
        end 
    end 
end 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
